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THE PRESIDENT AND IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram* 
S. Karthick Ramakrishnan** 
Abstract 
This Article lays out a systematic, conceptual framework to better 
understand the relationship between federal executive action and state-
level legislation in immigration. Prior immigration law scholarship has 
focused on structural power questions between the U.S. federal 
government—as a unitary entity—and the states, while newer scholarship 
has examined separation of powers concerns between the President and 
Congress. This Article builds on both of these traditions, focusing on the 
intersectional relationship between the federal Executive and subfederal 
lawmaking, which is an important yet overlooked dynamic in the 
resurgence of immigration federalism. First, this Article explains the 
relationship between presidential action and state reaction in the 
immigration field, deriving a typology from historical examples of 
curtailing, co-opting, and catalyzing state action. Next, it uses that 
tripartite framework to explicate the ways that the Obama Presidency has 
deepened presidential power through immigration federalism, sometimes 
in unintentional ways. As an example of an unintended consequence of 
presidential action, this Article provides a novel explanation for the rise 
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of state driver’s license laws for unauthorized immigrants. This Article’s 
analysis concludes that the President wields significant influence to bring 
coherency to immigration enforcement and instantiate a de facto national 
policy, using states to entrench his vision. In some circumstances, 
however, states may resist presidential action, thereby functioning as 
Congress’s proxy in separation of powers battles over immigration 
policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The President’s constitutional authority over immigration policy is 
one of the most divisive and contested subjects in political discourse, 
courts, legal academia, and newspaper op-eds. In June 2014, as news 
coverage focused on the surge of unaccompanied minors at the U.S.–
Mexico Border and legislative efforts to reform immigration law stalled 
in the U.S. House of Representatives,1 President Barack Obama 
announced, “I’m beginning a new effort to fix as much of our 
immigration system as I can on my own, without Congress.”2 Within five 
months, the President carried out his intentions, enacting a series of 
measures under the “Immigration Accountability Executive Actions” that 
included expanding his 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) program, creating the Deferred Action for Parental 
Accountability (DAPA) program, and shifting executive agency 
enforcement priorities at the U.S.–Mexico Border and in the interior.3  
President Obama’s 2012 implementation of DACA and more recent 
actions on immigration have generated vigorous and contentious debates. 
Most of these discussions, however, have unfolded in too narrow a 
context, focusing primarily on questions related to separation of powers: 
Was the President overstepping his authority and usurping congressional 
power? Was he merely exercising the discretion that the U.S. Constitution 
and federal law allow on immigration? Or, perhaps still, was the President 
using executive discretion chiefly as a means to prod Congress to pass 
legislation? Largely missing from these narratives, though, were the 
potential effects of executive action on state-level policy making and the 
potential feedback effects from states on separation of powers concerns. 
As this Article shows, exploring this nexus between executive action and 
immigration federalism offers a new vantage point to better understand 
power struggles between the President and Congress, and reveals how 
states can play an important role in resisting or entrenching the 
Executive’s national policy vision. 
Although largely ignored, the connections between presidential action 
and state and local responses should have been evident. As 
unaccompanied, undocumented children migrated in significant numbers 
                                                                                                                     
 1. P.J. Tobia, No Country for Lost Kids, PBS: NEWSHOUR (June 20, 2014, 2:18 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/country-lost-kids/. 
 2. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on Border 
Security and Immigration Reform (June 30, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/06/30/remarks-president-border-security-and-immigration-reform. 
 3. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Immigration Accountability Executive 
Action (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov//the-press-office/2014/11/20/fact-sheet-
immigration-accountability-executive-action; Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction. 
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in early 2014, the Obama Administration had to determine where to house 
and transport them.4 A few target communities, such as Murrieta, 
California, saw protests by residents and elected officials.5 At the same 
time, other cities, such as Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, and Los Angeles 
welcomed these same populations.6 California pledged money to help pay 
for pro bono legal services in state court proceedings, where a state judge 
might deem the child to fall within a status that triggers immigration 
benefits.7 Similarly, New York City allocated significant funds to its 
public defenders for immigrant defense8 and unaccompanied minor 
representation.9 
This same pattern—presidential action on immigration prompting 
new dynamics in state–federal relations—was also present in the Obama 
Administration’s DACA program. Much of the attention following 
DACA’s announcement in June 2012 focused on the political and 
legislative ramifications of the program.10 Politically, the announcement 
galvanized Latino voters in advance of the 2012 election.11 Legislatively, 
many thought the move would spur Congress to consider comprehensive 
reform or at least pass the DREAM Act.12 Although neither scenario 
played out at the national level, DACA had significant legislative and 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Nick Valencia, More Children Crossing U.S.-Mexico Border Alone, CNN (May 21, 
2014, 9:14 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/19/us/mexico-border-children/index.html. 
 5. Matt Hansen & Mark Boster, Protesters in Murrieta Block Detainees’ Buses in Tense 
Standoff, L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2014, 9:39 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
immigrants-murrieta-20140701-story.html. 
 6. Jeremy Redmon, Atlanta Mayor Joins Effort Welcoming Unaccompanied Immigrant 
Children, ATLANTA J.-CONSTITUTION (Oct. 1, 2014, 10:46 AM), http://www.ajc.com/news/
news/state-regional-govt-politics/atlanta-mayor-joins-effort-welcoming-unaccompanied/nhY6r/. 
 7. See Melanie Mason & Kate Linthicum, Gov. Brown Urges $3 Million in Legal Aid for 
Immigrant Children, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-
immigration-funds-20140822-story.html.  
 8. Deepti Hajela, NYC’s New Immigrant Public Defender Program Is 1st in U.S., NBC 4 
N.Y. (Sept. 7, 2014, 3:44 PM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/New-NYC-Immigrant-
Public-Defender-Program-Is-1st-in-US-274268751.html. 
 9. Press Release, N.Y.C. Council, New York City Council Initiative Ensuring All 
Unaccompanied Minors in NYC Have Lawyers (Mar. 24, 2015), http://council.nyc.gov 
/html/pr/032415um.shtml. 
 10. See, e.g., Andres Gonzalez & Alicia A. Caldwell, Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals, Obama Immigration Program, Begins Taking Applications, HUFFPOST: POL. (Aug. 15, 
2012, 11:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/15/deferred-action-for-childhood-
arrivals_n_1778834.html. 
 11. Adrian D. Pantoja, Latino Voters Strongly Reject House Republic Proposal on Border 
Crisis, LATINO DECISIONS (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.latinodecisions.com/blog/2014/
08/01/latino-voters-reject-house-gop-border-proposal/. 
 12. See, e.g., DACA—Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, LATINO/A EDUC. 
ACHIEVEMENT PROJECT WASH., http://www.leapwa.org/Downloads/DACA%20%EF%80%A2
DREAM%20Act.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
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policy effects at the state level. In the months immediately following the 
initiation of the program, the number of states offering driver’s licenses 
to undocumented immigrants—not just DACA beneficiaries—rose to 
thirteen, with other states considering similar action.13 Strikingly, while 
DACA has granted temporary relief to a portion of the undocumented 
population, the state driver’s license laws that followed inure to the 
benefit of the entire population,14 with no set expiration date. The cascade 
and momentum of state driver’s license availability continues to be a 
surprising and unintended byproduct of a federal executive decision.  
It may be tempting to think of the DACA–driver’s license dynamic as 
sui generis or an exceedingly rare event. Yet, a similar relationship 
between presidential action and state-level responses is evident in 
historical examples starting from the late 1800s and throughout the 
twentieth century.15 Additionally, the scope of executive action and state 
policy making need not be limited to large-scale administrative policies 
such as DACA. Take, for instance, executive decisions to sue, or refrain 
from suit, when states enact immigration-related policies. The decision to 
sue Arizona for enacting its immigration enforcement scheme, SB 1070, 
was a discretionary one lodged with the President and his Department of 
Justice (DOJ), with major consequences for a then-burgeoning state-level 
trend.16 Many state policies were overturned or severely curtailed, with 
policy momentum switching to more integrationist trends.17 In addition, 
the Executive Branch has designed federal enforcement programs to 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Understanding Immigration 
Federalism in the United States, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 24, 2014), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/report/2014/03/24/86207/understanding-
immigration-federalism-in-the-united-states/ [hereinafter Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, 
Understanding Immigration Federalism]. It is worth clarifying here that this Article does not 
claim that the Obama Administration knew that state license policy would change or that it 
implemented DACA with the intent of changing state policies in this way. 
 14. See Driver’s License Map, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., 
https://www.nilc.org/issues/drivers-licenses/drivers-licenses-map/ (last updated July 1, 2015). 
 15. See, e.g., Reconstruction, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-
war/reconstruction (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
 16. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497, 2510 (2012) (enjoining three out 
of the four challenged provisions of Arizona’s immigration enforcement scheme on grounds that 
they were unconstitutional). That decision led to the invalidation of most challenged provisions 
in then-pending suits regarding other state and local immigration enforcement laws in several 
federal circuits. See Alyssa McLendon & Curt Merrill, At a Glance: Supreme Court Decision on 
Arizona’s Immigration Law, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/06/us/scotus.
immigration/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (noting state statutes with similarities to the challenged 
Arizona laws). 
 17. See Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Federal Policy and Examples of State 
Action, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/deferred-action.aspx (discussing various state actions 
after President Obama issued DACA). 
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include state and local participation.18  
Together, these instances form a specific executive–state dynamic that 
legal commentary in the immigration field has, thus far, largely ignored. 
Outside of immigration law, Professor Bradford Clark reinvigorated 
discussion of the relationship between federalism and separation of 
powers, arguing that the difficulty of passing federal law can help 
preserve federalism.19 Other scholars have focused on federalism 
dynamics specific to presidential or administrative action. For example, 
Professor Gillian Metzger has explored the federalism dimensions of an 
ever-expanding administrative state,20 and Professor Jessica Bulman-
Pozen has extensively queried the role of states in turf battles between the 
President and Congress.21 Indeed, a recent article by Professor Bulman-
Pozen highlights the general dynamic we explore here.22 Even these 
projects, however, would benefit from the more systematic understanding 
of the Executive’s role in immigration federalism in particular that this 
Article provides.  
Within immigration scholarship, a significant volume of literature—
including our prior work—focuses on immigration federalism generally, 
mostly treating the federal government as a singular entity vis-à-vis the 
states.23 There is also a new, slowly growing literature on immigration 
law pertaining to separation of powers concerns between the President 
and Congress. For example, scholarship by Professors Adam Cox and 
Cristina Rodriguez specifically explicates the relationship between the 
President and Congress in creating immigration policy, noting the ways 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See, e.g., A Guide to the Immigration Accountability Executive Action, AM. 
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/
guide-immigration-accountability-executive-action. 
 19. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
1321, 1324 (2001).  
 20. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
567 (2011) (arguing that President Obama has increased state involvement in federal programs 
and regulations); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 
2023 (2008) (arguing that administrative law can reinforce federalism and help protect the role of 
states in federal government). 
 21. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and 
Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1922–23 (2014) [hereinafter 
Bulman-Pozen, Afterlife of American Federalism] (arguing that states act as staging grounds for 
fights between political parties and thus can be marshalled in power contests between the 
President and Congress); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 
1079–83 (2014) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism] (arguing that states provide 
additional and alternate fora for partisan contests). 
 22. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016).  
 23. See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The Importance of the 
Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431 (2012). 
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in which the President has exercised independent, expressly delegated, 
and implicitly delegated control over immigration policy.24 
While one might have expected the federalism and separation of 
powers literatures to speak to each other in the immigration field, 
especially given their contemporaneous growth in the realms of 
immigration law and policy, they have so far mostly remained on separate 
tracks (see Figure 1). What limited attention immigration scholars have 
given to executive–state dynamics has tended to focus on the doctrinal 
question of preemption,25 without an account of the myriad other ways in 
which presidential action affects state outcomes. One notable movement 
in this regard is Professor David Rubenstein’s developing theory of 
“immigration structuralism,” which urges the consideration of both 
federalism and separation of powers concerns when evaluating decisions 
about structural power allocation between states and the federal 
government.26 
This Article scrutinizes the crossroads between two areas of 
significant concern in immigration law: federalism analysis and 
separation of powers concerns. This Article seeks to explore this 
intersection in a systematic manner, opting to set out institutional 
arrangements and their possibilities for interaction, rather than a 
piecemeal approach that abstracts from a few contemporary examples. 
Indeed, a more systematic view of this intersection of executive branch 
action and state-level response reveals additional examples that fit into 
this institutional framework (see Figure 2). Thus, this Article takes a 
broad view of executive powers, focusing on a variety of executive 
actions—making treaties, decisions to litigate, agency directives—that 
affect state and local decision-making. Although this Article’s analysis 
begins in past eras of executive action, its primary purpose is to explore 
contemporary executive policies in this current era of sustained 
congressional stalemate and the expanded exercise of presidential power.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 
125 YALE L.J. 104 (2015); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and 
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 460–62 (2009); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Constraint Through 
Delegation: The Case of Executive Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1789–
90 (2010). 
 25. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 
2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 33 (2013) (noting that Arizona is “as much a case about separation of 
powers as [it is] about federalism”); Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and 
the President’s Power to Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 692 (2014) (exploring separation 
of powers issues raised in the immigration context, specifically in the context of preemption of 
state law).  
 26. David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Structuralism: A Return to Form, 8 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 83–84 (2013).  
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By concentrating on this under-theorized aspect of both separation of 
powers and immigration federalism in legal and political science 
scholarship, this Article aims to provide a richer understanding of 
contemporary developments in immigration policy. This analysis is 
critical in light of emerging federalism models from scholars, such as 
Professor Bulman-Pozen, who argue that in the current system, states can 
sometimes act as either another executive or legislative branch, thereby 
making any discussion of federalism inherently an implicit discussion of 
separation of powers.27 Thus, for example, state-level pushback might 
mitigate concerns about the inability of Congress to check executive 
authority; conversely, the possibility of state and local entrenchment of 
the Executive’s policy goals might ease concerns about the practical 
reach or permanence of federal executive action. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I situates the role of the 
President in immigration federalism. In doing so, it focuses on past 
examples of presidential power to uncover the relationship between those 
presidents and state-level dynamics. Specifically exploring responses to 
the Burlingame Treaty, the Bracero Program, and presidential use of 
refugee and parole authority, this Part showcases the federalism 
dimensions attendant to those exercises of executive power. From these 
antecedent examples, this Part develops a tripartite typology of executive 
immigration federalism: presidential actions that (1) are intended to 
curtail state-level trends, (2) co-opt state-level action, and (3) catalyze 
state-level policy making consistent with the Administration’s policy. 
This Part also notes that presidential action can sometimes generate 
substantial state-level resistance as states attempt to set the immigration 
agenda in opposition to executive policy. 
Part II then pivots to the present-day relationship between the 
Executive and state policy, considering ways in which the expanded use 
of presidential authority redounds to immigration federalism. 
Specifically, it shows that President Obama’s promulgation of 
enforcement priorities and strategic use of litigation has helped curtail 
state lawmaking; his management of federal enforcement programs—
such as Secure Communities (S-Comm) and 287(g) agreements, which 
result from Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA)—have co-opted state resources and agencies; and his use of large-
scale deferred action programs has catalyzed state policy making. Thus, 
Part II argues that President Obama has used immigration federalism to 
deepen his executive power, although this expansion has also met some 
occasional limits, with notable examples of resistance from states and 
localities.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Bulman-Pozen, Afterlife of American Federalism, supra note 21, at 1935–46. 
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Transitioning from the primarily historical and descriptive narratives 
of the first two Parts, Part III considers the doctrinal, pragmatic, and 
theoretical implications of presidential action on state-level immigration 
policies. It shows how the responsiveness of state-level policies to 
executive action on immigration (and vice versa) opens new ground for 
separation of powers battles and serves as the new immigration 
nationalism.28 Part III first assesses the doctrinal impact on preemption 
jurisprudence of the more conspicuous presence of the Executive’s role 
in immigration policy. It then examines the ways in which states and 
localities can potentially check executive power, relying on strategies that 
range from invoking Congress’s will to asserting states’ rights. Finally, 
this Article concludes by discussing ways in which the President can 
utilize federalism to entrench her regulatory vision, creating de facto 
national policy and making it more difficult for Congress to uproot or 
change it through subsequent legislation.  
Before proceeding, three clarifications are necessary. First, it is 
important to clarify this Article’s use of “the President” or “the 
Executive.” One way of thinking about this reference to the President is 
to distinguish it from any actions undertaken by Congress, the branch 
typically at issue in questions of federalism. This leaves both the 
Executive Branch and the administrative state as potential sources of 
federal policy that might interact with state-level policies. As various 
theoretical models have taught, the expansion of the administrative state 
has meant the concomitant expansion of presidential power.29 These 
scholarly inquiries also instruct that high-level policy directives issued by 
high-ranking agency officials under the President’s control are 
attributable to the President.30 As such, this Article intends to refer to the 
actions of the President himself in directing policy and setting national 
agenda priorities, as well as cabinet officials and other political 
appointees of the President in executive agencies. There is a growing 
body of literature that suggests distinguishing the President from agency 
action and, further still, dissecting relationships within and among 
                                                                                                                     
 28. This terminology and idea is borrowed from the theme of a recent feature by Professor 
Heather Gerken. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 
YALE L.J. 1889, 1917–18 (2014).  
 29. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 
1033 (2013); Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 
339, 344–48 (2010) (documenting a trend in presidential use of administrative agency action from 
Presidents Ronald Reagan through Barack Obama); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001) (examining a dramatic transformation in the relationship 
between the President and the administrative state); Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1383–85 (2012) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE 
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010)). 
 30. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 29, at 1034, 1040; Kim, supra note 25, at 694–95. 
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agencies themselves. For this Article’s purposes, however, agencies 
under presidential control are commensurate with the Executive Branch, 
and this Article only focuses on high-level appointees responsible for 
policy setting.31 
Second, and relatedly, this Article’s definition of executive action 
includes actions often taken with some congressional involvement. In 
other words, this Article is concerned with more than purely unilateral 
presidential decisions.32 Many executive actions are situated within a 
constitutional or legislative framework that requires some legislative 
approval. For example, the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 was a presidential 
immigration policy,33 but the Constitution mandates that every treaty 
receive Senate consent.34 Similarly, in other instances, Congress may 
have subsequently endorsed presidential action through law or prefigured 
substantial executive discretion and control into a statute itself. Especially 
in the immigration sphere, Congress has delegated expansive policy 
making authority to the Executive Branch.35 Accordingly, this Article’s 
notion of executive action encompasses decisions and policies that the 
Administration initiated or for which the Administration bears primary 
                                                                                                                     
 31. For purposes of this Article, this refers to the actions of a limited universe of actors—
the President, the Secretary of State and the State Department, the Attorney and Solicitor Generals 
and the Solicitor General within the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the Department 
of Homeland Security. This Article excludes the actions and decisions of career civil service 
employees and individual officials, such as line attorneys at the DOJ or field officers for ICE. 
Indeed, this Article notes that ICE officers attempted to sue the Secretary of Homeland Security 
over their disagreement with the Secretary’s—and hence, the President’s—prioritization of their 
immigration enforcement responsibilities. See Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 743 & 
n.6 (N.D. Tex. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015). We also 
acknowledge that this line-level dissent and discord is an underappreciated aspect of 
administrative law scholarship. See Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Experimentation and 
Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that “bottom-up” influences within 
administrative agencies might shape policies). 
 32. See generally Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of 
Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132 (1999) (developing a theory of unilateral presidential 
action taken without the consent of Congress). 
 33. See Milestones: 1866-1898—The Burlingame-Seward Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/burlingame-seward-treaty (last visited Feb. 27, 
2016). 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 35. Kim, supra note 25, at 714–19; see also HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE 
THE LAW 46–50 (2014) (discussing how the Executive Branch has significant control in enforcing 
immigration laws and forming immigration policy); Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 463, 511 
(expanding on the concept of de facto delegation). 
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political accountability and responsibility,36 including executive actions 
taken in the shadow of a federal statute or other congressional action. 
Finally, this Article does not address whether broad executive power 
in immigration law is normatively desirable. Instead, it starts from two 
less conflicted propositions. First, as detailed in Section I.A below, the 
President has, since the beginning of federal regulation of immigration, 
played a distinct role in forging or advancing immigration policy at times. 
Second, the discussion in Parts II and III assumes that the current legal 
landscape leaves significant room for presidential involvement in 
immigration matters. Here, the starting premise is that the present legal 
landscape, featuring significant congressional delegation of enforcement 
authority to the Executive Branch combined with limited funding for such 
enforcement, inevitably requires energetic and conspicuous presidential 
involvement.37  
I.  IMMIGRATION AT THE CROSSROADS OF FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION 
OF POWERS 
Prior legal scholarship has focused on two important dynamics in 
immigration law that largely have developed along parallel tracks—
immigration federalism and the boundary between the Executive’s 
immigration authority and Congress’s. Section I.A examines the 
relationship between the federal political branches in the context of 
immigration and distinguishes the President’s role. Section I.B dives 
deeper into examples of presidential action on immigration to tease out 
the federalism interactions that have largely been ignored. Finally, 
Section I.C culls from those antecedent examples of executive–state 
relationships three general categories of presidential action vis-à-vis 
state-level policy making: presidential actions that curtail, co-opt, or 
catalyze state and local policy making. This causal arrow can be 
reciprocal; at times, states have exerted significant influence on federal, 
and specifically executive, action.38 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See generally Andrias, supra note 29, at 1070–1102 (arguing that the President and 
high-level officials should prominently disclose reasons for taking executive actions and claim 
responsibility for them). 
 37. See id. at 1045 (arguing that “enforcement vel non matters . . . [because t]he law on the 
books is different from the law in action,” making executive enforcement decisions “a vital part 
of law’s identity as law”). But see Zachary Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 671, 673–77 (2014) (suggesting limits to exercises of executive enforcement 
discretion). This Article does not take a position as to what, if any, actions by Congress might 
regulate or constrain executive participation in immigration regulation. See, e.g., Saikrishna 
Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 225–30 (reviewing HAROLD 
J. KENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS (2005) and laying out four potential theories of when and how 
Congress might curtail the exercise of presidential power). 
 38. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 
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To be clear, this Article does not claim that the substantive policy 
responses between the national government and subfederal governments 
necessarily change when the federal entity in question is the Executive 
Branch. In many instances, states may be reacting to a policy because it 
is federal in origin, regardless of whether it involves Congress or the 
Presidency. At the same time, there are several structural and institutional 
reasons why the Executive’s role is different from that of Congress, 
including the nimbleness with which the Executive can instantiate, 
modify, or even reverse existing administrative policies.39 Thus, there are 
reasons to believe that some state-level responses to executive action will 
take advantage of these institutional distinctions. And, as Part III argues, 
in times of extended congressional gridlock, states become critical actors 
in separation of powers disputes, acting either as checks on executive 
power in the federal legislature’s stead or as instruments of legislative 
power, entrenching the President’s will despite an uncooperative 
Congress.40 
First, the President has myriad means to affect state-level policy 
making. As with the general tide of power accretion in the rise of the 
administrative state,41 the President and agencies under the President’s 
control wield significant authority in the immigration realm. Arguably, 
this is especially true in immigration law, where Congress structured the 
INA to provide substantial discretionary authority to the President and 
his delegates, and where the “law on the books” might be less meaningful 
than the law in practice.42 As this Article explains, this power accretion 
in immigration has left the Executive Branch with several different 
methods at its disposal to alter state-level dynamics—without 
accompanying federal legislation—including decisions to litigate, the 
power to calibrate enforcement efforts, and the authority to set agency 
priorities.  
Second, different political factors are at work in creating federal 
executive or administrative policy versus congressional legislation. The 
President responds to a national electorate and is not constrained by 
intrastate constituencies or primary contests that force extremist positions 
on immigration.43 Perhaps because of this national focus and the ability 
                                                                                                                     
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 478 (2012) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as Safeguard]. 
 39. See John D. Leshy, Shaping the Modern West: The Role of the Executive Branch, 72 
COLO. L. REV. 287, 304 (2001). 
 40. See infra Part III. 
 41. Andrias, supra note 29, at 1033; Kagan, supra note 29, at 2345 & n.381; see also 
Gilman, supra note 29, at 345–47 (discussing various presidential uses of executive power over 
the last several decades). 
 42. See Cox, supra note 25, at 55–56.  
 43. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A 
Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2108–17 (2013) [hereinafter Gulasekaram & 
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to transcend parochial prejudices, presidents throughout U.S. history 
have been much more capacious in their attitudes toward immigrants and 
immigration than has Congress.44 Thus, their policies, such as President 
Obama’s recent declarations,45 often reflect a more inviting and less 
prosecutorial stance than do congressional statutes.  
In addition, some forms of executive action are protected from federal 
court oversight in a way that congressional legislation is not.46 For 
example, the Supreme Court has found an administrative agency’s refusal 
to exercise enforcement authority to be presumptively unreviewable.47 
Moreover, five U.S. circuit courts of appeals dismissed suits from states 
seeking greater immigration enforcement and monetary compensation for 
the fiscal burdens they allegedly incurred because of federal immigration 
policy.48 And generally, plaintiffs in suits against discretionary executive 
actions are likely to suffer standing defects as well.49 Suits against 
congressional and state-level legislation, however, are commonplace in 
federal courts. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
Ramakrishnan, Reappraisal]; S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The 
Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1431, 1442–46 (2012) 
[hereinafter Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, Importance of the Political]. 
 44. See, e.g., JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS 102–07 (1964) (outlining 
policies to liberalize immigration statutes); Cox, supra note 25, at 63–64 (listing examples of pro-
immigration actions taken by Presidents Chester Arthur, Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman, John 
Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson but also noting that President Arthur did sign the anti-immigrant 
Chinese Exclusion Act).  
 45. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 46. However, a recent district court opinion suggests otherwise. In Texas v. United States, 
the district court found that Texas had standing to challenge the Obama Administration’s DAPA 
program. 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 643–44 (S.D. Tex. 2015), stay denied, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015). 
On the merits, the court found that DAPA violated the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at 677–
78.  
 47. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985) (declining to judicially review a 
decision by the Federal Drug Administration to not enforce certain regulations in the context of 
lethal injections). 
 48. Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997); California v. United States, 
104 F.3d 1086, 1094–95 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 806 (1997); Arizona v. United States, 
104 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 806 (1997); New Jersey v. United States, 
91 F.3d 463, 470 (3d Cir. 1996); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d. 23, 29–30 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(dismissing claims from New York officials); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094, 1097 (11th 
Cir. 1995) (dismissing Florida officials’ claims as presenting nonjusticiable political questions). 
 49. E.g., Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 207 (D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing a suit by 
Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio against President Obama’s deferred action policies for lack 
of standing), aff’d, 797 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 743, 
747 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (dismissing claims of line ICE agents for lack of standing), aff’d sub nom. 
Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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Next, the President is not fettered by the same procedural obstacles 
and vetogates that attend congressional lawmaking.50 As such, 
presidential action can be both more nimble in its creation and responsive 
in its modification than legislative action. The existence of several 
procedural obstacles such as filibusters, committee holds, and other 
legislative vetoes creates incentives for the use of executive action to 
effect national policy in the first place.51 Certainly, within administrative 
agencies, notice and comment requirements for rule making present 
hurdles to executive agency action.52 However, in cases such as litigation 
decisions or enforcement discretion, the President need not—or at least 
has not—utilized formal administrative rule making, instead proceeding 
through guidance memoranda.53 Moreover, the potentially greater 
procedural obstacles in Congress also structure the ways in which states 
and localities may react. Lobbying the Executive Branch to change its 
course of action is a more streamlined process than lobbying Congress to 
change legislation.54  
Finally, the President lacks the legislative power to actually change 
legal status or permanently alter rights and benefits of unlawfully present 
migrants.55 At the federal level, only Congress has that authority,56 and 
Congress has previously responded to executive action by either rejecting 
or approving the President’s actions. This limitation reveals the 
importance of immigration federalism to questions of executive power. 
In this current era of extended federal legislative stalemate, states and 
localities are responsible for accommodating those whom the President 
chooses to allow to remain in the country. Policies involving driver’s 
licenses, welfare provision, professional licensing, and in-state tuition fall 
within the purview of those state and local governments. Although, as 
this Article elaborates in Part III, these state and local policies are not 
substitutes for congressional action, they nevertheless can have the effect 
of entrenching the President’s policy vision in many parts of the country, 
making it more difficult for Congress to dislodge or uproot those policies.  
                                                                                                                     
 50. Professor Bradford Clark has argued that this difficulty of passing federal law helps 
preserve federalism. See Clark, supra note 19, at 1324. 
 51. Andrias, supra note 29, at 1070. 
 52. See id. at 1043. 
 53. See id. at 1042. 
 54. See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Behind Closed Doors, Obama Crafts Executive 
Actions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/19/us/politics/behind-
closed-doors-obama-crafts-executive-actions.html. 
 55. See, e.g., Daniel I. Morales, Immigration Reform and the Democratic Will, 16 U. PA. 
J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 49, 59 (2013) (noting President Obama’s provisional grant of legal status to 
“young and educated undocumented immigrants”). 
 56. Id. at 57. 
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A.  Distinguishing the Executive from Congress in Immigration Policy 
Most commentary on immigration federalism typically portrays the 
federal government as a singular locus of power engaged in a turf battle 
with state and local authorities over the exclusivity vel non of 
immigration policy.57 That view of the interplay between various levels 
of governmental authority, however, is a stylized one. As Professors Cox 
and Rodriguez have ably shown, that categorization is too broad because 
the President has wielded significant independent immigration authority 
since the federal government’s ascendancy as the prime regulating 
authority in the immigration field.58 
Indicative of this elision between the political branches are the 
foundational Supreme Court cases in immigration law. In Chy Lung v. 
Freeman,59 one of the Supreme Court’s first significant immigration 
federalism cases, the Court struck down a California law allowing a state 
immigration commissioner to make discretionary decisions regarding 
admissions at state ports.60 In so doing, the Court first iterated that 
immigration regulation was a congressional responsibility vis-à-vis the 
states but then seemed to comingle the competencies of both political 
branches: “The passage of laws which concern the admission of [foreign] 
citizens . . . to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the 
States. . . . [T]he responsibility for the character of those regulations, and 
for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national 
government.”61 
Although the Court noted congressional exclusivity in passing laws, 
the next sentence lumped Congress with the Executive, collectively 
describing the responsibility of the “national government.”62 That 
framing matters because the manner of execution of any immigration law 
primarily would be within the constitutional and statutory authority of the 
President, not Congress. 
More than a decade after Chy Lung, in Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States (the Chinese Exclusion Case),63 the Court articulated the principle 
of federal plenary power over immigration policy. In upholding the 
Chinese Exclusion Act, the Court declared that “[t]he power of exclusion 
of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the 
government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers 
delegated by the Constitution . . . cannot be granted away or restrained 
                                                                                                                     
 57. See sources cited supra notes 19–26 and accompanying text.  
 58. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 463, 511. 
 59. 92 U.S. 275 (1875). 
 60. Id. at 280–81. 
 61. Id. at 280.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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on behalf of any one.”64 That language again frames the political branches 
as a unitary entity. Although the case focused on the constitutionality of 
a federal statute, the Court’s reasoning relied on the national 
government’s competence in determining the nation’s foreign affairs, a 
subject over which the President has concurrent, if not predominant, 
responsibility.65 
Despite these characterizations, the opportunities for divergent action, 
or even tension and conflict, between the two branches clearly exists and 
has defined several important developments in immigration law since the 
late 1800s. Clarifying the division of responsibility between Congress 
and the President has profound consequences for the viability of state and 
local immigration laws.66 
Professors Cox and Rodriguez detail this tension between the 
legislature and the executive, noting that the President has exercised 
immigration authority in a number of situations.67 Their study focuses on 
two main historical examples of executive power: the Bracero Program 
and the Caribbean migrant crisis.68 As they explain, President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt initially negotiated the Bracero Program—which allowed 
temporary labor migration of Mexican workers to address wartime labor 
shortages—without explicit congressional approval, instead funding the 
Program through discretionary executive department funds.69 In their 
other example, five different administrations, in responding to the various 
Haitian and Cuban crises over the past four decades, utilized authority 
delegated to it by federal statute to parole thousands of migrants into the 
United States.70 As a practical matter, this repeated and mass use of parole 
authority constructed a broad-scale immigration policy for Caribbean 
migrants.71 
These examples reveal the distinction between the Legislative and 
Executive Branches on immigration matters and the ability of the 
Executive to use power at his disposal to instantiate federal immigration 
policy. In both instances, the executive action forced Congress’s hand, 
leading to legislation harmonious with the Executive’s vision.72 While 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. at 609. 
 65. See id. at 590, 604–05. 
 66. See infra Section III.A. 
 67. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 484–85. 
 68. See id. at 485. 
 69. Id. at 485–89. 
 70. See id. at 492–97. 
 71. See id. at 497. 
 72. See infra Section I.B. After the initial creation of the Bracero Program, the President 
sought and gained congressional approval and funding, a pattern that repeated itself again when 
Congress’s period of approval expired and the President sought to renew the Program. Cox & 
Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 488–89. In those instances, Congress was sometimes a less-willing 
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Congress, on its own accord, may not have acted—or may have 
significantly delayed acting—in both situations, these exercises of 
executive authority created policy momentum that tied the hands of 
federal lawmakers. 
In addition to these historical examples, presidents can also deem 
certain groups to have temporary protected status73 to shield from 
removal foreigners from certain countries with troubled conditions 
resulting from political strife or natural disasters.74 Additionally, 
Presidents throughout U.S. history have granted other varying forms of 
temporary relief to a variety of groups depending on the political, 
economic, or humanitarian exigencies of the period.75 These include, for 
example, Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush’s “Family 
Fairness” orders in 1987 and 1990, which allowed the family members 
(who were ineligible for statutory relief) of many recipients of 
legalization under Congress’s 1986 immigration law to remain in the 
United States.76 
Many of these are not unilateral executive exercises of authority. In 
this model of accreted executive power, three factors—(1) Congress’s 
passing of harsher and more complex immigration regulations, which, 
along with increased labor mobility, creates (2) a growing and sizable 
                                                                                                                     
partner, with several members reluctantly acquiescing to the President’s Program. See generally 
KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 42–
72 (1992) (describing the conflicts between the Executive Branch and Congress over the Bracero 
Program). Congress eventually dismantled the Program in 1964. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 
24, at 490. Professors Cox and Rodriguez’s second example is the discretionary use of parole 
authority—the power to allow a person into the country without legally admitting them—to 
respond to humanitarian and political needs. See id. at 502. Reaching a zenith in the 1970s and 
1980s, a significant number of migrants from the Caribbean made their way to the United States 
in their attempts to leave unstable or unfavorable political and economic situations in their home 
countries. See id. at 492–93, 493 n.106. In response, multiple presidents used their discretionary 
power to parole groups of arriving migrants from these countries into various locales within the 
United States. See id. at 494–97. This mass use of parole authority to address the influx of Cubans 
and Haitians highlighted the need for a more systemic policy and initially led to Congress passing 
the Refugee Act of 1980. See id. at 503. Further migration and executive parole use throughout 
the 1980s led to legislation that specifically provided for status normalization of the groups 
allowed entry into the United States through parole. Id. at 508. 
 73. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2012). 
 74. Temporary Protected Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.usc 
is.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status-deferred-enforced-departure/temporary-protected-
status (last updated Feb. 19, 2016). 
 75. See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE GRANTS OF TEMPORARY IMMIGRATION 
RELIEF 1956-PRESENT 1–2 (2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/
executive_grants_of_temporary_immigration_relief_1956-present_final.pdf.  
 76. Reagan-Bush Family Fairness: A Chronological History, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. 
(Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/reagen-bush-family-fairness-
chronological-history. 
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undocumented population, and (3) the President’s constitutional 
responsibility for and control over the immigration enforcement 
apparatus—inevitably produce a situation wherein Congress has 
effectively delegated significant back-end policy making power to the 
President.77 Using tools such as prosecutorial discretion and enforcement 
prioritization, the President exercises substantial control over those who 
have found their way into the country either through congressionally 
sanctioned channels or by clandestine entry.78 Such executive 
intervention has come to define federal immigration policy. As Professor 
Kate Andrias argues, enforcement decisions constitute a “vital part of 
law’s identity as law.”79 
However, providing a full-throated defense of the constitutionality of 
presidential authority in immigration law is not the intention of this 
Article. This Article simply notes that some presidential control over 
immigration policy is inevitable80 and leaves normative arguments over 
the propriety of specific exercises of executive authority for other 
scholarly work. Instead, this Article proceeds to dissecting these 
instances of presidential control in search of previously unexplored 
federalism interactions. 
B.  Executive Action and States: Historical Antecedents 
While it is clear that the President exercises power over aspects of 
immigration policy, the President’s distinct role in federalism remains 
unexplored. Over the past 150 years, federal executive action on 
immigration has had unstudied effects on state-level policy. At times, this 
has taken the form of the Executive attempting to staunch a state-level 
trend, or vice versa, with states attempting to counter federal policy. At 
other times, state responses have facilitated federal executive action, 
either by placing greater pressure on Congress to act or by effectively 
working around federal legislative constraints to effectuate de facto 
national immigration policy.81 
This Section sets the stage for the contemporary exploration of state 
and local interaction with the Executive that comprises Parts II and III by 
                                                                                                                     
 77. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 528–33. See generally Adam B. Cox & Eric 
Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 814–22 (2007) 
(discussing examples of policy preference priority for immigration and types of procedures to 
carry those policies out). 
 78. See Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, AM. IMMIGRATION 
COUNCIL (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/understanding-
prosecutorial-discretion-immigration-law. 
 79. Andrias, supra note 29, at 1045. 
 80. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Andrias, supra note 29, at 1034, 1054. 
 81. See infra Part II. 
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examining historical examples of the President’s effect on and role in 
subfederal immigration policy. This Section examines these examples of 
executive exercises of immigration authority to uncover the attendant 
federalism aspects.82 It explicates the immigration federalism aspects of 
the period before and after the Burlingame Treaty, the state response to 
the Bracero Program, and reactions to the use of parole and enforcement 
actions against Caribbean and Central American migrants. It explores 
these examples because they represent prominent, high-profile assertions 
of executive power initially taken either without congressional assent or 
in times of congressional inaction, and they inspired substantial state-
level responses. Additionally, these examples clearly illustrate the range 
of ways in which the Executive interacts with state policy, leading to the 
typology explicated in Section I.C that follows. 
1.  The Burlingame Treaty and California’s Reaction 
The Burlingame Treaty, signed during President Andrew Johnson’s 
Administration and under the direction of Secretary of State William 
Seward,83 provides an early example of federal executive action that both 
responded to and galvanized opposition from states and localities. Prior 
to the years following the Civil War, the policies of several states stood 
in as immigration policy for a nation that had few federal immigration 
laws.84 On the West Coast, those regulations took on a strident anti-
immigrant, anti-Chinese tone.85 Starting in the 1850s, after significant 
numbers of Chinese and other Asian immigrants began arriving mainly 
to work in mining, California enacted several policies intending to deter 
and exclude the Chinese from immigrating to or remaining in the state.86 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See infra Table 1. 
 83. John Schrecker, “For the Equality of Men—For the Equality of Nations”: Anson 
Burlingame and China’s First Embassy to the United States, 1868, 17 J. AM.-E. ASIAN REL. 9, 20, 
26 (2010). 
 84. On the East Coast, several states with major ports of entry maintained significant 
admissions controls at those ports. These jurisdictions excluded convicted criminals and enacted 
“poor laws” intended to include those who might become a drain on the public fiscal by becoming 
public charges. See Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law 1776-1875, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841–48 (1993). They also maintained laws restricting the movement of 
slaves and free blacks. Id. at 1865–69. Other laws protected against public health problems, 
excluding nonresidents who arrived with communicable diseases. See id. at 1859–60; Anna O. 
Law, 19th Century Immigration Federalism (on file with authors). 
 85. California, specifically San Francisco, other western territories, and new states were the 
epicenter of anti-Chinese sentiment and laws. See Earl M. Maltz, The Federal Government and 
the Problem of Chinese Rights in the Era of the 14th Amendment, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
223, 224–25 (1994). At the same time, it would be a mistake to believe that such sentiment only 
existed on the West Coast. See id. at 249. 
 86. For example, soon after gaining statehood, California maintained a “foreign miner’s 
tax” requiring noncitizen miners—at that time, predominantly Chinese—to pay to work. Lin Sing 
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 Despite these state laws, in response to business interests and foreign 
policy prerogatives, the Executive encouraged labor migration during the 
mid-1800s.87 The first major federal foray into the regulation of 
admission was not a congressional statute; rather, it was a treaty between 
the United States and China negotiated by the Johnson Administration.88 
Although treaties must receive Senate approval, the political force behind 
it was the Executive Branch’s desire to bolster relations with China 
during a time of deep partisan divide in a Reconstruction-era Congress.89  
Indeed, many in Congress desired to rescind the Treaty after its 
implementation but failed in their first attempt to do so.90 Amidst growing 
domestic anti-Chinese sentiment and resentment of the migration patterns 
emerging after the Treaty, Congress passed the Fifteen Passenger Bill in 
1879 that would have restricted steamships from bringing more than 
fifteen Chinese passengers to the United States.91 President Rutherford 
Hayes, however, vetoed the bill on the grounds that it would contravene 
the goals of the Burlingame Treaty, thereby thwarting Congress’s will.92  
The Burlingame Treaty of 1868 also exposed the distinctions between 
the Executive and state preferences with regard to Chinese immigration.93 
                                                                                                                     
v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 536 (1862). The tax was initially three dollars per month but gradually 
increased to twenty dollars per month by 1870, the year it was struck down. The Chinese 
Experience in 19th Century America: Some State of California and City of San Francisco Anti-
Chinese Legislation and Subsequent Action, UNIV. OF ILL., http://teachingresources.atlas.illinois. 
edu/chinese_exp/resources/resource_2_4.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). The state also took a 
stab at Chinese exclusion by passing an 1858 “Act to prevent the further immigration of Chinese 
or Mongolians to this state,” which was later contested in court. Lin Sing, 20 Cal. at 538 (“This 
act has never been repealed; but we have been informed from the bench that an attempt was made 
to execute it; and that the Supreme Court in an opinion which has never been reported, declared 
[the state’s 1858 law, an Act to prevent the further immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to this 
state,] unconstitutional and void.”). Like with the foreign miner’s tax, lower federal courts and 
the California Supreme Court struck down this state exclusion bill and many other similar laws. 
See id. at 580 (striking down as unconstitutional an 1862 state tax intended to protect white labor 
from competition by Chinese labor); In re Ah Chong, 2 F. 733 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (striking down 
a state law prohibiting the Chinese from obtaining fishing licenses as a violation of the U.S. 
Constitution); In re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 F. 481, 517, 521 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (striking down a state 
law imposing criminal sanctions on anyone employing a Chinese or Mongolian person). 
Nevertheless, courts upheld other state taxes and restrictions on foreign workers.  
 87. See Peter J. Duignan, Making and Remaking America: Immigration into the United 
States, HOOVER INST. (Sept. 15, 2003), http://www.hoover.org/research/making-and-remaking-
america-immigration-united-states. 
 88. Schrecker, supra note 83, at 20, 26. 
 89. Id. at 11–12, 20, 26–27; see also Maltz, supra note 85, at 229 (highlighting the conflict 
between U.S. Senators and the President concerning Chinese people’s rights under the 
Burlingame Treaty).  
 90. Maltz, supra note 85, at 249. 
 91. See id. at 249 & n.154. 
 92. Id. at 249. 
 93. See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 
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The Treaty provided for the unfettered migration of Chinese laborers, 
who were necessary for construction of the transcontinental railroad, and 
reassured China that its citizens would not be discriminated against in the 
United States.94 By its text, the Treaty purported to accord citizens of 
China residing in the United States the same status and treatment 
“enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nations.”95 The 
purpose of that provision was to reassure China about the safety and 
treatment of its citizens in the face of the rising tide of anti-Chinese state 
and local laws, particularly in California.96  
However, far from protecting immigrants from discriminatory state 
and local laws, the Burlingame Treaty instead galvanized significant 
backlash, ranging from violent rioting against the Chinese in California 
to state legislative efforts to oppose the federal policy and mitigate its 
effects.97 In 1870, the state passed an anti-kidnapping and importation 
law intended to prevent Asian women, presumed to be prostitutes, from 
immigrating and working against their will.98 Accompanying the anti-
kidnapping law, the state also passed an anti-coolie law intended to target 
Chinese male laborers.99 California then amended the anti-kidnapping 
law in 1874 to require a bond for immigrating passengers who were 
convicted criminals or presumed prostitutes.100 All three enactments were 
attempts to reassert state authority over its borders as a way of controlling 
what it considered to be the detrimental effects of demographic and 
cultural change within its borders wrought by the Executive Branch’s 
                                                                                                                     
15 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 650–51 (2005). 
 94. CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 98 (1994). 
 95. Maltz, supra note 85, at 229. In fact, partially in response to California’s treatment of 
Chinese immigrants, Congress also passed the Civil Rights Act of 1870, which in one of its 
provisions directed states to provide all “persons” the same protections as “white citizens” with 
regard to certain enumerated rights. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16–17, 16 Stat. 140, 
144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)); see also Lucas Guttentag, The 
Forgotten Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 9–10 (2013) (arguing that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1870 enshrines an equality norm in federal statutes that should be considered when 
evaluating the preemptive effect of federal laws on restrictive immigration regulations such as 
Arizona’s SB 1070). Notably, however, the Chy Lung case discussed herein did not rely on the 
Civil Rights Act of 1870, and the Act has not by itself been dispositive in any immigration 
federalism case. 
 96. See Schrecker, supra note 83, at 29–30; see also Maltz, supra note 85, at 229 (noting 
that the antidiscrimination provision angered Senators who saw it as a threat to several existing 
state policies). 
 97. LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF 
MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 9–14 (Thomas A. Green & Hendrik Hartog eds., 1995). 
 98. Abrams, supra note 93, at 674–75. 
 99. Id. at 675. 
 100. Id. at 676–77. 
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foreign policy toward China. 
The Supreme Court in Chy Lung cut short California’s foray into the 
regulation of Chinese immigration.101 Despite the Court’s rebuke of the 
state’s admission regulations, California’s reaction illustrates the 
interaction between federal executive action and state policies. Even after 
Chy Lung stripped California of its power to undermine the entry of 
Chinese immigrants into its jurisdiction, the state continued to put 
political pressure on federal officials. Cities such as San Francisco 
continued to enact restrictive policies intending to target Chinese 
businesses, work opportunities, and cultural practices.102  
In 1876, the California legislature passed “An Act concerning the 
Burlingame Treaty,” dedicating public money for sending a delegation to 
Washington, D.C. to lobby for modification of the Treaty to prevent 
immigration of certain classes of Chinese persons.103 Then in 1877, 
California passed “An Act to ascertain and express the will of the people 
of the State of California upon the subject of Chinese immigration,” 
which called for a vote by the people of the state to voice their sentiments 
on the topic of Chinese immigration.104 In the following legislative 
sessions, the state then adopted four anti-Chinese resolutions, two of 
which directly called for the modification or repeal of the Burlingame 
Treaty.105  
Finally, and perhaps the most dramatic state action on immigration, 
California held a constitutional convention that for the first time encoded 
discrimination against Chinese immigrants in the state constitution, 
forbidding their employment by corporations or governments and 
empowering “incorporated cities and towns of this State for the removal 
of Chinese.”106 Importantly, this constitutional moment in California was 
part of a more general mood in the state of the need for radical reform 
and served as a model for other states to follow.107 Oregon, for example, 
                                                                                                                     
 101. See id. at 677–78. 
 102. Notable examples included bans on the use of “yeo-ho” poles across shoulders to 
transport goods on city sidewalks and on gongs at theatrical performances, various laundry 
ordinances directed at Chinese-owned businesses, and a “queue” ordinance requiring the cutting 
of Chinese prisoners’ hair upon arrival at the county jail. See, e.g., S.F., Cal., General Orders of 
the Board of Supervisor Order 1587 §§ 27, 42, Order 1588 § 11(3), Order 1589 § 10(L), Order 
1599 § 8 (1870) (banning or limiting the beating of gongs in performances; banning use of poles 
across backs to carry baskets).  
 103. 1876 Cal. Stat. 906. 
 104. 1877 Cal. Stat. 558. 
 105. 1878 Cal. Stat. 439, 440; 1877 Cal. Stat. 439, 440. 
 106. See CAL. CONST. art. XIX (1879). 
 107. Harry N. Scheiber, Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Historical Perspective on the 1879 
California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35, 36–37 (1989) (“[M]any advocates of 
reform joined in this call for California to fulfill its special destiny as ‘a model for all other 
States.’” (quoting California Leadership, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 17, 1878, at 2)). 
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prohibited the hiring of Chinese on municipal projects in 1872.108 
Thus, the Burlingame Treaty, an executive-led action that was meant 
in part to curtail the discriminatory effects of state actions against Chinese 
immigrants, provoked a new round of state legislation resisting Chinese 
immigration and integration. After the signing of the Treaty, state and 
local actions served as an oppositional response to the Executive’s vision, 
thereby acting as a substitute for Congress’s inattention or inability to 
respond to popular sentiment. Eventually, Congress responded with laws 
that substantially resembled California’s efforts, providing a national 
voice to the state sentiment.109 Following the Page Act of 1875, Congress 
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, abrogating parts of the 
Burlingame Treaty and accomplishing precisely what California had 
intended to do years earlier.110 Ultimately, these federal laws succeeded 
in achieving California’s underlying goal of undoing the preferences of 
the Executive in negotiating and maintaining the Burlingame Treaty. 
2.  The Bracero Program and State Responses 
One of the most consequential immigration policies spearheaded by 
the President—with effects still felt today in the ongoing debate over 
unauthorized migration—was the Bracero Program, a temporary worker 
program designed to bring in seasonal migratory labor from Mexico to 
satisfy U.S. labor needs.111 The Bracero Program showcases multiple 
examples of state-level responses to executive action. In some instances, 
such as Texas’s reassessment of its antidiscrimination efforts, executive 
decisions helped bring about significant changes to state policy; in other 
instances, such as the creation of state migratory labor commissions, the 
state-level policies helped facilitate the executive action by dealing with 
                                                                                                                     
 108. David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 211, 222 (1999). 
 109. The first congressional regulation of immigration—the Page Act of 1875—addressed 
the specific issue of the migration of Chinese women and concerns over prostitution. Abrams, 
supra note 93, at 643. It excluded, through federal law, the same group against whom California’s 
“anti-kidnapping” law of 1870 was directed. See id. at 643–44, 674. 
 110. See id. at 695. 
 111. See CALAVITA, supra note 72, at 1. Prior to the Bracero Program of the 1940s to 1960s, 
the United States also ran a temporary worker program—mainly for Mexican laborers—from 
1917 to 1921, in the wake of World War I. See JOYCE VIALET & BARBARA MCCLURE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 6 (1980). This first 
major program was started in 1917, and the majority of migrant workers arrived for farming work 
in California, Texas, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, and Idaho. Id. The program was only officially 
active through 1921. Id. However, the law allowed for extending the program beyond that date in 
particular cases. Id. President Woodrow Wilson utilized this policy of exceptions and so did 
President Warren Harding to continue migration of agricultural workers beyond the presumed end 
of the program. Id. 
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its consequences.112 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt initially conceived and created the 
Bracero Program as a stopgap, emergency response to the significant 
labor shortage caused by the United States’ participation in World War 
II.113 As early as 1940, farming and agricultural interests in Arizona, 
California, and Texas requested that the federal immigration service 
allow them to bring in Mexican laborers.114 The agency denied these 
requests, but by 1942, labor needs and shortages appeared much more 
urgent to the federal administrative agencies regulating labor, agriculture, 
and immigration.115 Under pressure to provide for those labor needs, the 
President negotiated a bilateral agreement with the Mexican government 
to provide for seasonal migration of Mexican workers116—the so-called 
“braceros.”117 The Bracero Program processed over 4.6 million workers 
during its over two decades of operation.118 
Like the Burlingame Treaty, the Bracero Program eventually elicited 
congressional response.119 Despite the eventual congressional 
                                                                                                                     
 112. See Otey M. Scruggs, Texas and the Bracero Program, 1942-1947, 32 PAC. HIST. REV. 
251, 263 (1963). 
 113. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 24, at 462, 540 (noting President Roosevelt’s lack of 
congressional authorization before implementing his worker shortage initiative). 
 114. CALAVITA, supra note 72, at 19. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Agreement Between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting the 
Temporary Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers, E.A.S. No. 278, 56 Stat. 1759, 1763–64 
(1942). The major studies of this Program have focused on two critical aspects. First, scholars 
have focused on the way in which the Bracero Program created, and then influenced, patterns and 
networks of cyclical migration across the southern border, eventually contributing to the unlawful 
immigration flows that continued after the Program ended. See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 35, 
at 45. Second, scholars have scrutinized the relationship between unilateral presidential action and 
congressional response, with its attendant separation of powers concerns. See Cox & Rodríguez, 
supra note 24, at 490–91. 
 117. CALAVITA, supra note 72, at 1. 
 118. Ruben J. Garcia, Labor as Property: Guestworkers, International Trade, and the 
Democracy Deficit, 10 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 27, 46 (2006). 
 119. See CALAVITA, supra note 72, at 22 (noting that “on April 29, 1943, Congress enacted 
Public Law 45, officially endorsing the Bracero Program”). Initially conceived as a one-time 
temporary labor fix, the Program was subsequently reauthorized several times. In 1943, Congress 
“quietly authorized the program” seven months after it had already begun. Id. at 18. Congressional 
reauthorization of the “wartime” Bracero Program ended in 1947. Id. at 25. Despite this lapse of 
congressional approval, executive agencies continued the Program until 1951, while the 
Administration renegotiated a new agreement with Mexico. See id. at 25, 30, 39. Kitty Calavita 
does not interpret this period as necessarily showcasing executive dominance in running the 
Bracero Program. See id. at 25. Rather, she argues that this period reflected an understanding 
between Congress and the administrative agencies in charge of the Program. See id. She argues 
that Congress and the Executive Branch were not at loggerheads during this time but rather were 
operating under a tacit agreement that the Program should continue under administrative guidance 
if Congress was unwilling or unable to legislate. See id. Only after 1951 did Congress provide 
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endorsement, the Bracero Program is nevertheless fairly characterized as 
a program driven chiefly by the prerogatives of multiple presidential 
administrations and the agencies within their control.120 As noted 
sociologist Kitty Calavita put it, “the Bracero Program was in fact a series 
of programs initiated by administrative fiat, subsequently endorsed by 
Congress, and kept alive by executive agreement whenever foreign 
relations or domestic politics threatened their demise.”121 In 1950, 
complaints about the Program from domestic labor groups and unions 
were brought not to Congress but rather to the President’s Commission 
on Migratory Labor, an executive committee established by President 
Harry S. Truman.122  
The Bracero Program created state-level legislative effects, as some 
states and localities responded to the increased and consistent presence 
of migrant workers in their midst.123 First, braceros did not spread evenly 
throughout the country; instead, migrant workers concentrated in 
Arizona, California, and Texas—states that required significant 
agricultural labor.124 For federalism concerns, Texas’s situation is worth 
greater scrutiny because Mexico was wary of Texas’s record of 
discrimination and excluded Texas farms from participation in the 
Program.125 While discrimination was an issue for Mexican migrants all 
over the country, Mexican officials were particularly sensitive about what 
many considered to be the overt and consistent discrimination 
experienced in Texas.126  
                                                                                                                     
clear support for the Program after nearly a decade of its existence by passing Public Law 78, 
which institutionalized the Program with a more permanent status. See id. at 43. 
 120. See id. at 25. 
 121. Id. at 1–2. 
 122. See id. at 19, 29. 
 123. See, e.g., Scruggs, supra note 112, at 255. 
 124. See ROBERT C. MCELROY & EARLE E. GAVETT, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. ECON. 
REPORT NO. 77, TERMINATION OF THE BRACERO PROGRAM: SOME EFFECTS ON FARM LABOR AND 
MIGRANT HOUSING NEEDS 15–16 (1965). After 1951, foreign workers spent about ninety-five 
percent of their total labor time in eight states: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Michigan, New Mexico, and Texas. Id. at 15. Over the course of the Bracero Program, the vast 
majority of migrants found work in Arizona, California, and Texas. Id. at 15–16. As with the 
influx of Chinese laborers in the mid- to late nineteenth century, California received the largest 
number of workers during the “wartime” Bracero years of 1942 to 1947. See id. Eventually, Texas 
became a top destination as well, and throughout the Program, the overwhelming majority of 
braceros ended up in either California or Texas. See id. at 16. 
 125. Scruggs, supra note 112, at 254. Although Texas farmers were blacklisted from 
recruiting braceros through official channels, they were still able to find workers through 
unauthorized channels or by sidestepping the bilateral agreement between the countries. See id. 
at 253–55. During the initial years of the Program, Texas was the destination for the largest 
number of undocumented laborers. Id. at 251. 
 126. Id. at 254. 
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During the time when Texas was a banned destination for bracero 
labor, the Executive Branch did not mount serious opposition to the 
Mexican government’s stance. Although the U.S. State Department urged 
Mexico to reconsider its ban after the onset of the Program, it never 
insisted.127 To the contrary, State Department officials urged immigration 
officials at the Texas–Mexico border to shut down the border recruitment 
process that was allowing Texas growers to circumvent the Mexican 
government’s blacklisting by hiring undocumented workers.128  
Furthermore, the bilateral agreements between the executive 
departments of both countries guaranteed nondiscriminatory treatment of 
Mexican nationals.129 As such, it appears that the U.S. Executive Branch 
was also worried about Texas’s dismal reputation undermining the State 
Department’s foreign policy efforts with Mexico.130 As a result, the State 
Department was not overly concerned with Texas having to take 
additional steps to bring the state in line with the image of cooperation 
and nondiscrimination that the Executive Branch aimed to promote.131 
Perhaps most importantly, the differential treatment of Texas from all 
other states did not derail or otherwise cause the United States to back out 
of entering the general executive agreement covering the migration 
program.132 In other words, the Administration appeared willing to use 
Mexico’s ban to help leverage changes in state policy that it considered 
advantageous to its foreign policy prerogatives. 
In response to being cut out of the Program, Texas officials tried to 
show that they had addressed the discrimination cited as the reason for 
the ban.133 Texas Governor Coke Stevenson prodded the state legislature 
to pass the “Caucasian Race” resolution in May 1943, which was intended 
to “affirm[] the right of all Caucasians[—including Mexicans—]within the 
state to equal treatment in public places of business.”134 Despite this 
action, the Mexican government announced that it still would not 
authorize braceros for Texas based on the report of its consuls in the 
                                                                                                                     
 127. See id. at 256, 258. 
 128. See CALAVITA, supra note 72, at 23–24. However, this alternative channel was not shot 
down, partly because of the support of congressional members from the border regions. See id. 
 129. See Scruggs, supra note 112, at 262. 
 130. See id. at 258–60. 
 131. See id. at 255–56, 259; see also RICHARD B. CRAIG, THE BRACERO PROGRAM: INTEREST 
GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICY 39–40 (1971) (discussing the initial negotiations for the wartime 
Bracero Program and noting that “[t]he State Department’s primary concern was the possibility 
that the fledgling Good Neighbor Policy might suffer a severe setback if Mexican nationals were 
exploited or discriminated against during their stay in this country”). 
 132. See Scruggs, supra note 112, at 262. 
 133. See id. at 260. 
 134. Id. at 255. 
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state.135 This recalcitrance from Mexico galvanized the government of 
Texas to more conspicuously address the issue. Soon after Mexico’s 
announcement, Governor Stevenson “departed on a ‘good will’ tour of 
Mexico” and promised that state law enforcement officials would address 
cases of discrimination.136 Finally, Governor Stevenson convened the 
Good Neighbor Commission to more acutely study and remedy those 
concerns.137 Indeed, as historian Otey M. Scruggs concludes:  
Mexico’s policy of using the braceros as a lever to force 
Texas to take steps to end discrimination against Mexicans 
was not devoid of results. More than any other factor, it was 
responsible for the creation of the Good Neighbor 
Commission, which in 1947 became a permanent agency of 
the Texas government.138  
As part of the commission’s work, Governor Stevenson and the 
Mexican foreign minister outlined steps to ameliorate discrimination.139 
Eventually, in 1947, Mexico discontinued its blacklisting and began 
allowing lawful worker migration to Texas, albeit under a separate 
agreement than that which applied to other states.140 
Beyond the specific example of Texas’s policy change, more broadly, 
the Bracero Program initiated a time of significant migratory labor 
movement, both foreign and domestic.141 The Program’s cycle of 
seasonal migrant labor from Mexico also affected domestic labor 
migration, as domestic workers began seeking work in non-Bracero 
states.142 This period of large-scale international labor migration, as well 
                                                                                                                     
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. at 255–56. 
 137. Id. at 263. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 255. 
 140. See id. at 261–62. The separate agreement for Texas admissions reminded officials and 
workers in both Mexico and the United States that the Mexican government was still especially 
cautious about conditions within Texas. See id. at 262. 
 141. CRAIG, supra note 131, at 31; see also CALAVITA, supra note 72, at 141 (noting that 
“Texas was both the largest importer and the largest exporter of migrant labor”); Ellis W. Hawley, 
The Politics of the Mexican Labor Issue 1950–1965, 40 AGRIC. HIST. 157, 166 (1966) (discussing 
arguments made by non-Bracero states against the ability of Bracero states to import cheap labor 
and noting that “[c]omplaints from the Northwest virtually ceased after the growers there learned 
that Mexican labor in California would add to the supply of domestic migrants in Washington and 
Oregon”). 
 142. See Elizabeth W. Mandeel, The Bracero Program 1942-1964, 4 AM. INT’L J. CONTEMP. 
RES. 171, 178 (2014). As an example, in the 1950s, domestic labor migrants who had been coming 
to California began bypassing the state in favor of other states due to the California’s increasing 
reliance on bracero labor. See Mark Ellis, Reinventing US Internal Migration Studies in the Age 
of International Migration, 18 POPULATION SPACE & PLACE 196, 200 (2012). 
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as disruptions in domestic labor migration, caused several states to 
address the concerns attendant to these displacements. First, some states 
began dealing with the increased presence of a migrant labor source and 
its attendant concerns. Whether those migrants were domestic citizen 
migrants, domestic migrants who were lawful immigrants, foreign 
undocumented migrants, or foreign temporary workers, states and 
localities were forced to confront everyday concerns such as housing, 
health care, and education for this work force. For example, in 1953, 
Colorado enacted its Migrant Children Educational Act, intended to 
“facilitate the education of migrant children.”143 Other laws, such as 
Colorado’s 1953 statute concerning the health inspection of immigrants, 
authorized the state health department to inspect immigrants for “cholera 
or other dangerous communicable diseases” and to treat them for it 
through local boards of health.144 Similarly, Wisconsin enacted a law 
intended to license and monitor migrant labor camps, which employers 
built for use by seasonal or migrant workers and their dependents.145  
Second, states began creating administrative agencies to facilitate 
migratory movement and relocation. A 1964 U.S. Department of Labor 
publication listed the various state and local community-based efforts to 
integrate or at least ameliorate living conditions for this migratory labor 
supply.146 Relevant to this Article’s study of federalism concerns, the 
publication highlights the creation of state committees on migratory labor 
in twenty-eight states.147 States created these committees for the purpose 
of coordinating programs for migrants at the state level, noting that well-
functioning state committees effectively promoted action on a state level 
and promoted programs on a local level, such as summer school, health 
clinics, and integration programs.148 
Finally, state lobbying to Administration officials regarding 
immigration enforcement efforts during the Bracero period reflected 
                                                                                                                     
 143. 5 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 123-30-1, -3 (Supp. 1953). Recognizing the increased presence 
of a transitory labor supply that did not reside full time within the school district, the law was 
geared toward finding workable educational solutions so that this demographic would not be 
excluded from state school systems altogether. See id. § 123-30-3. The law defined “migrant 
child” as a child of school age who was the child of, or in the custody of, a migrant agricultural 
worker. Id. § 123-30-2(c). The law further defined “migrant agricultural worker” as “an individual 
engaged in agricultural labor in this state who is residing in a school district which is not his 
regular domicile during the performance of such agricultural labor.” Id. § 123-30-2(d). 
 144. E.g., 3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 66-3-4 (1953). 
 145. 1 WISC. STAT. § 146.19 (1957). 
 146. W. WILLARD WIRTZ & ARTHUR W. MOTLEY, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & BUREAU OF LABOR 
STANDARDS, WELCOME STRANGER! GOODBYE FRIEND: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO 
IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL MIGRANTS 1–2 (1964). 
 147. Id. at 7. 
 148. Id. at 7–8. 
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distinct state-by-state preferences. Several states during the Bracero 
period were interested in limited immigration enforcement. For example, 
Texas officials pushed the immigration service to maintain flexibility in 
border rules so that the state could bypass the official Bracero Program 
during the time that Mexico banned Texas from the Program.149 More 
generally, in states such as Arizona, California, Idaho, and Nevada, and 
state agencies and state representatives wanted the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to forbear from immigrant apprehensions 
and deportations during times of labor shortage, as farming interests 
desired both braceros and unauthorized migrant labor.150  
3.  Paroled and Unauthorized Migrants and Local Responses 
State and local reactions to the Executive Branch’s response to the 
influx of Caribbean and Central American migrants during the 1970s and 
1980s represents a third example of presidential immigration federalism. 
In this instance, states and localities pushed back against enforcement 
efforts, forcing the Executive to reconsider its prosecutorial stance, and 
ultimately helped urge Congress toward providing relief for large swathes 
of the undocumented population. Several factors—including the advent 
of the Cold War, the dismantling of the Bracero Program, the post-1965 
numerical restrictions on Western Hemisphere migration, and civil and 
political unrest in several Caribbean and Central American countries—
led to increased numbers of migrants from those areas seeking to 
unlawfully enter the United States, arriving with the hopes of receiving 
refugee assistance, or both.151 The Executive Branch was forced to 
respond. 
Multiple presidential administrations dealt with these arrivals by using 
their executive power to parole the migrants into the country.152 Although 
not lawfully admitted with any permanent immigration status, once inside 
the country, many of these migrants became embedded in local 
communities. State and local responses to these exercises of mass parole 
helped set the national enforcement and legislative agenda to resist 
increased enforcement against these groups and created momentum 
                                                                                                                     
 149. See Fred L. Koestler, Bracero Program, TEX. STATE HISTORICAL ASS’N (June 12, 2010), 
https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/omb01. 
 150. See CALAVITA, supra note 72, at 33–36. As a prime example, in 1953, two House of 
Representative members representing southern California agricultural areas actively lobbied the 
administration officials to limit enforcement efforts against undocumented Mexican immigrants. 
California Seeks More “Wetbacks,” N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1953, at 1. As the New York Times 
reported, Representative Robert C. Wilson “complained about the border patrol’s ‘over-
zealousness’ in enforcing the immigration laws.” Id. at 14. 
 151. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 503–06. 
 152. Id. at 492–93. 
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toward legislative accommodations that helped regularize the status of 
these migrants. 
Haitian refugee arrivals presented a particular enforcement problem 
for the Administration. During the 1970s, the increasing number of 
Haitian arrivals began to create a processing backlog for immigration 
officials.153 The INS generally detained the migrants for short periods 
before eventually paroling them into the United States with work 
authorization.154 As the number of arriving migrants began to increase 
during the course of the decade, federal, state, and local officials— 
especially in South Florida—began to voice concerns over the effect, in 
local jurisdictions, of this continued influx.155 In response, the INS began 
to develop protocols for streamlining the removal process for Haitian 
arrivals.156 Advocacy groups attacked this “Haitian Program” in court, 
claiming that the revised and targeted procedures violated the 
Administrative Procedures Act and due process guarantees.157 
The Administration’s policies toward arriving Cubans diverged from 
its treatment of Haitians. In 1980, in response to mass Cuban arrivals—
the result of the Mariel boatlift—President Jimmy Carter, along with the 
INS, paroled large numbers of Cubans into the country, many of whom 
would receive permanent residency.158 For a short time after the boatlift, 
Congress eased the path for both Haitian and Cuban migrants to gain 
permanent residency through measures such as the Cuban–Haitian 
Entrant Program.159 However, after President Reagan took office in 1981, 
his Administration’s treatment of Haitians took a decidedly less-
welcoming turn. In addition to the further streamlining of the removal 
process for Haitian arrivals,160 the Reagan Administration also instituted 
interdiction programs to attempt to preemptively prevent Caribbean 
migrants’ arrival on U.S. shores.161 In addition, the INS under President 
Reagan resumed the use of mass exclusion hearings and prolonged 
detention of Caribbean migrants.162 
                                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at 494. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 511 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (finding 
that some government procedures violated migrants’ due process rights), modified sub nom. 
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 158. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 507–08. 
 159. See, e.g., id.; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CUBAN-HAITIAN ENTRANT 
PROGRAM (CHEP), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/cuban-haitian-
entrant-program-chep (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
 160. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 497–98. 
 161. See Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (Sept. 29, 1981). 
 162. Gilburt Loescher & John Scanlan, Human Rights, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Haitian 
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It was in this atmosphere of heightened and unequal executive 
immigration enforcement against Haitian migrants that some states and 
localities began passing early versions of the sanctuary ordinances that 
are still in force today. In response to the Executive’s decision to detain 
and mass deport Haitian migrants, some cities—Brookline and 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Oakland, California—passed local “non-
cooperation” ordinances, declaring themselves sanctuaries for migrants, 
including Haitian migrants and other vulnerable groups, in spite of 
federal immigration authorities.163  
Beyond the Haitian context, the 1980s witnessed the burgeoning of 
the broader sanctuary movement aimed at Central American migrants.164 
The civil and political unrest in countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, 
and El Salvador during the 1980s resulted in significant migration to the 
United States.165 Due to restrictions on legal migration, the majority of 
those migrants entered unlawfully through the southern border of the 
United States, escaping detection by the INS and border patrol.166 The 
increasing number of unlawfully present Central American migrants 
within the country led to calls for the Administration to step up its 
domestic deportation enforcement against this group.  
In response, local and state jurisdictions across the country passed 
sanctuary ordinances aimed at hindering the Executive’s enforcement 
efforts and facilitating the continued presence—regardless of 
lawfulness—of these migrants.167 Throughout the mid- to late 1980s and 
through present day, several dozen state and local jurisdictions have 
affirmed and reaffirmed their intent to remain sanctuaries and limit 
cooperation with federal enforcement efforts.168 These places may have 
                                                                                                                     
Refugees, 26 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 313, 345 (1984). 
 163. Brookline, Mass., Ordinance Res. Concerning Sanctuary for Refugees from El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti, Art. 24 (1985); Cambridge, Mass., Res. Declaring the City a 
Sanctuary 3 (Apr. 8, 1985), http://www.factcheck.org/UploadedFiles/City_of_Cambridge_1985_
Sanctuary_Resolution.pdf; Oakland, Cal., Ordinance Res. 63950 (July 8, 1986). 
 164. See Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative 
of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 252–53 (2012); Rose 
Cuison Villazor, What Is a Sanctuary?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 138–43 (2008).  
 165. Villazor, supra note 164, at 137, 140 & n.38. 
 166. See Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION 
POLICY INST. (Apr. 1, 2006), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/print/4621. 
 167. See, e.g., House of Representatives of the State of New Mexico, A Memorial 
Requesting Consideration for the Refugees from El Salvador, 37th Legis., 1st Sess. House Mem. 
5 (1985); N.Y. State Assembly, Resolution: Sanctuary for Guatemalans and Salvadors, Res. 
95147-03-06 (June 3, 1986); EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS, REFUGEE POLICY, EXEC. ORDER NO. 257, ART. IV (1985). 
 168. See, e.g., Sara Gaiser, Supervisor Campos Moves to Reaffirm Sanctuary City Status, 
S.F. APPEAL (Sept. 22, 2015, 11:02 PM), http://sfappeal.com/2015/09/supervisor-campos-moves-
to-reaffirm-sanctuary-city-status/; Steve Hendrix, Takoma Park Stays Immigrant ‘Sanctuary,’ 
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preferred not to have hundreds of refugees, parolees, or other 
unauthorized migrants in their midst, but given the enforcement structure 
and decisions that landed them there, these states and localities responded 
by recognizing the migrants’ presence and acquiescing to their continued 
stay.169 Indeed, partly in response to the intractability of the problem of 
several hundred thousand unlawful migrants from Central American 
countries remaining in the United States, Congress eventually responded 
with a mass legalization program as part of its 1986 Immigration Reform 
and Control Act and other relief measures.170 
C.  Prior Executive Action and Immigration Federalism: General 
Themes 
Reexamination of the antecedent examples discussed above helps 
uncover a pattern of state-level effects and responses to executive-led 
immigration action. Although the specific instances yielded a variety of 
ways in which executive branch decision-making interacted with state-
level policies, the interactions comprise three basic categories: (1) the 
Executive’s power to curtail or counteract state-level policy making; (2) 
executive action designed to co-opt state policies and possibly obviate 
them; and (3) executive action that catalyzes state-level policy making, 
either intentionally or unintentionally. In addition, there is a potential 
fourth theme—that of state and local reactions intended to counteract or 
express displeasure with presidential action. This reciprocal state and 
local feedback is often baked into the three primary themes, as a reaction 
to either ongoing or impending federal executive action. Part II applies 
these categories to contemporary presidential action, providing a 
systemic conceptual framework within which to understand current 
forms of executive influence on immigration federalism dynamics. 
The initial impetus for the Burlingame Treaty demonstrates the type 
of action that the Executive takes to curtail state and local policies. Recall 
that at the time the Treaty was signed, several cities within California, as 
well as the state itself, were creating explicitly anti-Chinese policies. The 
Treaty attempted to override those policies by announcing a general 
nondiscriminatory policy toward the Chinese in the United States, as 
negotiated between officials in both countries.171 As detailed below with 
                                                                                                                     
WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/10/29/AR2007102902241.html. 
 169. See Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism 
or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 297, 308–10 (1989). 
 170. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, 3359 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012)); see also Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central 
American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193 (1997) (codified as amended at 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1255). 
 171. See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
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contemporary examples, this type of executive action that cuts against the 
grain of a subfederal movement might not fully staunch the state and local 
trend. In the case of the Burlingame Treaty, state and local governments 
in California attempted to continue their anti-Chinese campaign in new 
forms despite the Treaty. As such, this form of executive action can create 
virulent backlash from states. 
Examples of the Executive attempting to co-opt state agencies or 
placate state-level policy preferences appear in the transition to federal 
immigration control after Chy Lung and again with the Bracero 
Program.172 Despite ousting state control over immigration matters, the 
first federal immigration laws in 1882 kept state structures intact, relying 
on state commissions to continue their screening duties, but now with 
oversight by executive branch officials.173 Later, when the federal 
government created its own administrative structures, those federal 
agencies recruited state immigration officials to staff them, thus allowing 
state input into federal immigration enforcement.174  
Similarly, one year before the Bracero Program began, facing 
impending labor shortages, growers and officials from large farm states 
petitioned the immigration service to directly import Mexican workers.175 
Farmers in border states had begun recruiting undocumented Mexican 
workers to help address their labor needs.176 The initial Bracero 
agreement attempted to obviate unilateral actions by local interests within 
states with large agricultural sectors.177 Relatedly, executive decisions to 
temper immigration enforcement efforts so as to ensure non-
apprehension of unauthorized workers helped quell pressure from federal 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Examples of Congress engaged in this dynamic of attempting to co-opt and obviate state 
action abound in immigration law. The 1875 Page Law and the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act are 
notable historical examples, with each largely adopting state prerogatives and obviating the need 
for state action by federalizing state objectives. See Abrams, supra note 93, 690–92, 695. As a 
more recent example, Professor Peter Spiro argues that the enactment of 1996 federal immigration 
laws creating harsher removal consequences for immigrants was a federalization of state 
objectives contained in California’s failed Proposition 187. Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with 
Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1632–33 (1997). 
 173. An Act to Regulate Immigration, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882) (leaving state 
commissioners and officers in charge of examining and screening incoming passengers from ships 
and levying a fifty-cent head tax on all immigrants at U.S. ports); Hidetaka Hirota, The Moment 
of Transition: State Officials, the Federal Government, and the Formation of American 
Immigration Policy, 99 J. AM. HIST. 1092, 1099 (2013). 
 174. E.g., Hirota, supra note 173, at 1105–07 (noting that many of the state officials who 
created and ran robust state immigration agencies in New York and Massachusetts were recruited 
into the federal immigration bureaucracy and helped mold the development of federal policy). 
 175. CALAVITA, supra note 72, at 19. 
 176. Id. at 28–29. 
 177. See id. at 19. 
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representatives of several farming states.178  
Both the Bracero Program and the Caribbean and Central American 
migrant surges of the 1970s and 1980s illustrate the third category of 
executive action—that which catalyzes state and local policies. With the 
Bracero Program, the State Department expressly included 
nondiscrimination provisions in its bilateral agreements and was keen not 
to undermine its fledgling Good Neighbor Policy with Mexico.179 The 
Executive’s seeming acquiescence to Mexico’s blacklisting helped prod 
Texas to reconsider its enforcement history and then to create policies 
and agencies to bring the state in line with the Administration’s vision for 
its relationship with Mexico.180 As another example, the significant 
numbers of both foreign and domestic migrant workers who became a 
persistent reality during the mid-twentieth century also galvanized state 
and local action. The various state committees on migratory labor 
attempted to focus on areas of concentrated migrant populations, 
providing social services and integration services for that population.181 
Similarly, states and localities also responded to the influx of 
Caribbean migrants, many of whom executive action paroled into the 
country, and the significant numbers of Central American migrants who 
unlawfully entered.182 The sanctuary movement saw local jurisdictions 
and local organizations in certain migrant-friendly parts of the country 
offering a safe haven to these populations.183 
II.  THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY: DEEPENING EXECUTIVE POWER THROUGH 
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 
This Article’s exploration of some of the latent federalism concerns 
in prior episodes of executive immigration action reveals broader themes 
of executive action and immigration federalism. This Part examines these 
present-day assertions of presidential power within the tripartite 
framework derived from Part I’s exploration of past instances of 
executive action. In doing so, this Part describes the breadth of 
presidential decision-making that creates immigration federalism 
consequences, including deciding to litigate, changing agency 
enforcement priorities, leveraging federal resources into coercing or 
disciplining state action, and administratively creating a class of lawfully 
present persons. Importantly, this framework allows for clearer 
consideration of the doctrinal and political consequences of, and potential 
for, presidential power in immigration federalism that Part III discusses. 
                                                                                                                     
 178. See id. at 32–33. 
 179. CRAIG, supra note 131, at 39–40. 
 180. Scruggs, supra note 112, at 255. 
 181. See WIRTZ & MOTLEY, supra note 146, at 7. 
 182. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 487–89. 
 183. See supra text accompanying notes 163–68.  
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These possibilities are most evident with regard to the third type of 
presidential action, which focuses on the opportunities for the Executive 
to galvanize state-level policy making. 
A.  Counteracting State-Level Policy Making: Litigation and 
Enforcement Prioritization 
The President may significantly curtail state-level policy by using 
her discretionary executive authority to initiate or weigh in on litigation 
against state or local enactments that the President believes undermines 
her preferred vision of immigration policy and enforcement. While the 
Executive Branch might counteract state policies in other ways, inviting 
the federal court system to do so is a powerful tool at the Executive’s 
disposal, one that the Executive has rarely employed in immigration 
matters until recently. It is also a uniquely executive function because 
Congress does not control the federal litigation apparatus.184 Further, as 
Arizona v. United States185 teaches, this ability to legally attack state-
level immigration lawmaking is chiefly premised on the President’s 
power to set agency priorities within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).186 This Section analyzes these two related actions—
participating in litigation and establishing enforcement priorities that 
become important in litigation—in turn. 
Although litigation is a tool many administrations have used in 
numerous regulatory areas to stop state-level trends or a particular 
subfederal policy, it has only been used sparingly in the immigration 
context. Thus, the recent and repeated appearance of the Obama 
Administration’s DOJ in several suits challenging state and local 
regulations represents a particularly “robust effort” by the Executive to 
control the immigration debate and channel the direction of present-day 
immigration policy.187 In recent years, the Executive’s decision to enter 
or abstain from litigation has been the subject of presidential politics, 
with significant consequences for subfederal policy in several 
regulatory areas.188  
 
                                                                                                                     
 184. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control 
of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 570 (2003). 
 185. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 186. See id. at 2507. 
 187. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and 
Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2103 (2014). 
 188. For example, several scholars have noted the substantial decrease in prosecutions in 
certain regulatory areas during the George W. Bush Administration. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 
29, at 1060–63; Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned, 4 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 80–81 (2009). 
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In immigration federalism cases, parties challenging the state or local 
regulation have mainly argued preemption, contending that the state-level 
policy must yield to federal law.189 But the Executive’s decision to 
become the litigating party in such cases is not predetermined or required, 
even when the legal claim is based on the supremacy of federal power. In 
fact, in the overwhelming majority of immigration federalism cases, the 
Executive Branch has refrained from initiating suits even when it had a 
plausible structural power claim on which it could prevail. In most cases, 
beginning in the late 1800s, private plaintiffs aggrieved by state policies 
raised preemption claims on their own without the federal government’s 
presence as a litigating party.190 The same was true in the litigation 
challenging Arizona’s SB 1070. Separate from the federal government’s 
landmark suit, individuals and advocacy groups filed six other complaints 
asking a court to strike down the law.191 Those suits also presented 
preemption claims, arguing that Arizona was intruding upon federal 
authority over immigration192—the same claim made by the federal 
government.  
Since 2010, however, this turn toward the involvement of the federal 
government as a litigating party has formed an exceptional and 
noteworthy trend.193 Consistent with general empirical findings outside 
the immigration context, this Article’s examination of immigration 
federalism cases from the late 1800s through the present day reveals the 
importance of this type of executive decision in curtailing state policies. 
Of immigration federalism cases reaching the Supreme Court or circuit 
courts of appeals since 1875, the federal government was the suing party 
in only a handful of instances, with almost all of them arising in the past 
four years as challenges to state enforcement schemes in Alabama, 
                                                                                                                     
 189. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497. 
 190. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 & n.1 
(C.D. Cal. 1995), aff’d in part and dismissed in part by 131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997); Lucas 
Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State Power: Reflections on Arizona v. 
United States, 9 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1, 8 & n.32 (2013). 
 191. Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1054–55 (D. Ariz. 2012), aff’d sub 
nom. Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Coal. of Latino Clergy & 
Christian Leaders v. Arizona, No. 2:10-cv-00943-SRB, slip op. at 2, 17 (D. Ariz. Dec. 10, 2010) 
(dismissing the case); Escobar v. Brewer, No. 4:10-cv-00249-SRB, slip op. at 2, 9 (D. Ariz. Aug. 
31, 2010) (dismissing the case for lack of standing); Frisancho v. Brewer, No. 2:10-cv-00926-
SRB, slip op. at 6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 24, 2010) (dismissing the case for lack of standing); League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Arizona, No. 2:10-cv-01453-SRB, slip op. at 10–11 (D. Ariz. May 
31, 2010) (staying the case until final rulings in Friendly House and Arizona); Complaint, Salgado 
v. Brewer, No. 2:10-cv-00951-SRB (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010). 
 192. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 34, 36, 42, 
Friendly House, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (No. CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB), 2011 WL 5367286. 
 193. See MOTOMURA, supra note 35, at 81; Cox, supra note 25, at 31–32; Rodriguez, supra 
note 187, at 2103. 
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Arizona, and South Carolina.194 Additionally, all the immigration 
federalism suits in which the DOJ challenged state enforcement schemes 
resulted in wins for the federal government.195  
At the district court level, the federal government has brought suit a 
few more times, but it is still an exceedingly rare event. Notably, in 1906, 
President Theodore Roosevelt sued the San Francisco School Board for 
its policy of segregating Japanese schoolchildren into Chinese schools, 
but the Administration’s entering into a new agreement with Japan settled 
that dispute.196 More recently, in 2009, the United States prevailed in 
federal district court in a suit challenging an Illinois law prohibiting 
employers from enrolling in e-Verify.197 The federal government also 
prevailed as the defendant in two immigration federalism suits, 
successfully fending off New York City’s request for a declaratory 
judgment that the city’s policy to prohibit communication with federal 
immigration authorities did not violate federal law and California’s claim 
that the federal enforcement policy fiscally harmed it.198  
In short, federal intervention makes a difference in immigration 
federalism litigation. Admittedly, immigration cases present too small of 
a sample from which to draw significant conclusions. Yet, broader studies 
of federal government participation support the thesis as well. An 
empirical study of the Rehnquist Court’s preemption decisions suggests 
that the DOJ’s participation either for or against preemption correlates 
with an increase in the chances of that position prevailing.199 Also, the 
federal government’s appearance as a party significantly affects results in 
cases before the Supreme Court.200 In any case, the federal government’s 
                                                                                                                     
 194. MOTOMURA, supra note 35, at 81. 
 195. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012); United States v. South Carolina, 
720 F.3d 518, 533 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1301 (11th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013). Certainly, all these cases left intact portions of the 
state laws at issue. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510 (holding that “it was improper . . . to 
enjoin § 2(B)” of SB 1070). Nevertheless, the results can be fairly characterized as wins for the 
federal government and losses for states. 
 196. See MOTOMURA, supra note 35, at 36.  
 197. United States v. Illinois, 92 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43,510, 2009 WL 662703 (C.D. 
Ill. Mar. 12, 2009). 
 198. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1115 (2000); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1095 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
522 U.S. 806 (1997). 
 199. Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 73–74 (2006). 
 200. See id.; see also Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus 
Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 773 (2000) (noting that amicus 
support by the Solicitor General influences the Supreme Court); Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining 
Executive Success in the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 505, 505 (1998) (noting the 
advantages the U.S. government holds when litigating before the Supreme Court). 
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presence as a party sends a powerful symbolic message in preemption 
cases. The party most likely to understand the complex ways in which 
state laws interfere with or otherwise intrude into federal prerogatives and 
processes is the federal government.201 
Aside from directly bringing suit, the DOJ may participate in less 
conspicuous ways but with nearly the same effect. The federal 
government has participated as amicus curiae in immigration federalism 
litigation before federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court on five 
occasions.202 In three of the five immigration federalism cases in which 
the federal government weighed in as amicus, courts unequivocally ruled 
in favor of the party supported by the United States.203 The rulings in the 
remaining two cases were not “wins,” but the courts’ opinions 
nevertheless showcased the power of the Executive’s intervention.204 
This small sample size of immigration federalism case filings is 
consistent with general studies of amicus filings similarly demonstrating 
the influence of the DOJ when the federal government weighs in on a 
case.205 
In one of the two cases that did not result in a clean win for the 
Executive, Plyler v. Doe,206 two presidential administrations took 
differing positions on the Texas state law that allowed public primary 
schools to exclude undocumented students.207 The Carter Administration 
supported the undocumented children, but the Court did not resolve the 
case by the end of President Jimmy Carter’s term.208 The Reagan 
Administration’s brief later argued that Texas’s law allowing public 
                                                                                                                     
 201. This seems especially so when part of the federal government’s preemption argument 
relies on the DOJ’s parsing of the manner in which the Executive has chosen to enforce 
congressional laws as written. For instance, the Solicitor General’s brief to the Supreme Court in 
Arizona relied on memoranda issued by ICE, in which the ICE Director spelled out his instructions 
as to how to utilize agency enforcement resources. See Brief for the United States at 4–5, Arizona 
v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 249 (2012) (No. 11-182). 
 202. See Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1979 (2011) (U.S. amicus brief 
for the party challenging state law); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 204 (1982) (U.S. amicus brief 
for the State of Texas), reh’g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 
334 U.S. 410, 411 (1948) (U.S. amicus brief for party challenging state law); Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 56 (1941) (U.S. amicus brief for party challenging state law); Villas at Parkside 
Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 533 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (U.S. amicus 
brief for party challenging local law). 
 203. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 422 (striking down a state law on commercial fishing); Hines, 
312 U.S. at 74 (striking down a state alien registration scheme); Villas at Parkside Partners, 726 
F.3d at 525 (striking down a local rental ordinance). 
 204. See Chamber of Commerce, 131 S. Ct. at 1979, 1986; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 204. 
 205. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 200, at 789–90. 
 206. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 207. MOTOMURA, supra note 35, at 5. 
 208. Id. 
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primary schools to exclude undocumented students was neither 
structurally preempted by the federal government’s exclusive control 
over immigration nor statutorily preempted by the INA.209 However, the 
brief also clarified that the DOJ considered undocumented students to be 
“persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause and expressly declined to take a position on whether 
the state law was an equal protection violation.210 The Plyler Court, 
consistent with the Solicitor General’s brief, found that the Equal 
Protection Clause protected undocumented children and, further, that the 
Texas law violated it.211 At least one DOJ official—Chief Justice John 
Roberts in his former position as Special Assistant to the Attorney 
General—interpreted the result as a missed opportunity; he suggested that 
if the Solicitor General had more firmly supported the state law, the Court 
would have upheld it.212  
The other case in which the Executive chose to file an amicus brief 
also demonstrates the impact of federal involvement in litigation, albeit 
in an odd manner.213 Although the federal government was not a party to 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,214 the Court invited the federal 
government to submit an amicus brief supporting the Chamber’s 
challenge to the state law penalizing employers for hiring unauthorized 
workers.215 Ironically, however, a revelation in the DOJ’s filing became 
a key part of the majority opinion upholding the Legal Arizona Workers’ 
Act, denying the Chamber’s preemption claim.216 Specifically, the DOJ’s 
                                                                                                                     
 209.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10–20, Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (Nos. 80-
1538, 80-1934), 1981 WL 390001. 
 210. Id. at 24–27.  
 211. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227 n.22, 230. 
 212. Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 972 (2014). 
 213. In the suit challenging the Legal Arizona Workers’ Act, which required all employers 
within Arizona to use the federal e-Verify database, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a private 
business association, sued the state of Arizona. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 
1968, 1976–77 (2011). The suit alleged preemption, relying on a provision of federal law that 
“expressly preempt[ed] ‘any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than 
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ . . . unauthorized aliens.’” Chamber 
of Commerce, 131 S. Ct. at 1975 (omission in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012)). 
Citing federal regulations that only made database use voluntary for most businesses, the Chamber 
argued that the mandatory use of the system would burden the federal government in a manner 
not contemplated or provided for by the federal scheme. Id. at 1986. Relatedly, the Chamber 
maintained that mandatory use of the database within a state would overwhelm federal resources 
unaccustomed to responding to the verification requests of every business within a state. Id. 
 214. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
 215. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1–2, Chamber 
of Commerce, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (No. 09-115), 2010 WL 3501180 [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Curiae 
Brief]. 
 216. See Chamber of Commerce, 131 S. Ct. at 1979–80. 
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brief mentioned that DHS was encouraging greater e-Verify use and had 
attested that Arizona employers’ mandatory use of e-Verify would not 
overly burden it.217 While that position alone did not resolve the 
preemption claim, the majority’s decision expressly relied on that 
representation, using the DOJ’s statement to bolster the argument that the 
state law would not undermine federal enforcement efforts.218  
Related to the power to litigate is the President’s ability to determine 
how to execute immigration law219—a decision that had dispositive 
consequences for the enforcement-heavy state and local policies of the 
last ten years. A key feature of the Government’s argument in Arizona 
was its reliance on ICE memoranda that laid out immigration 
enforcement priorities.220 In other words, that portion of the 
Administration’s argument was based on enforcement calibration 
decisions promulgated by administrative agency officials and blessed by 
the Executive. The argument highlights another aspect of executive 
power to curtail state and local activity. The President and the agencies 
under his control may issue memoranda that set agency priorities.221 The 
creation of these priorities, in turn, influences the viability of state 
immigration policies through their use in immigration federalism cases 
and policy debates.  
In recent years, under the Presidencies of Bill Clinton, George W. 
Bush, and Barack Obama, ICE and its predecessor agency have issued 
memoranda setting the Administration’s enforcement priorities in 
investigation and removal cases. These memoranda suggest that ICE’s 
enforcement resources should be deployed in a manner consistent with 
the threats posed by unlawfully present persons.222 To be clear, not all of 
                                                                                                                     
 217. See U.S. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 215, at 34. 
 218. Chamber of Commerce, 131 S. Ct. at 1986 (“Whatever the legal significance of [the] 
argument [that mandatory state e-Verify laws would overwhelm the federal system], the United 
States does not agree with the factual premise.”).  
 219. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (2012). 
 220. Brief for the United States, supra note 201, at 4–8. 
 221. E.g., id. 
 222. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, on 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enf’t Priorities of the 
Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, & Removal of Aliens to Field Office Dirs., Special Agents 
in Charge, and Chief Counsel of U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (June 17, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; Memorandum 
from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, on Civil Immigration Enf’t: 
Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, & Removal of Aliens to Employees, U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enf’t (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washing 
tondc.pdf; Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, on Prosecutorial Discretion to Chief Counsel of Office of the Principal 
Legal Advisor (Oct. 24, 2005), http://shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretionimmigration10 
05.pdf. 
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these memoranda were expressly promulgated in response to state and 
local lawmaking. Indeed, the oft-cited memorandum from INS 
Commissioner Doris Meissner predated both the September 11 attacks 
and the rise of state and local regulations since the mid-2000s.223 
More recent DHS guidelines were clearly directed to the several state 
enforcement interventions of the mid-2000s. For example, the 2012 DHS 
Guidance on State and Local Governments’ Assistance in Immigration 
Enforcement and Related Matters expressly stated that “[i]n light of laws 
passed by several states addressing the involvement by state and local law 
enforcement officers in federal enforcement of immigration laws, DHS 
concluded that this guidance would be appropriate to set forth DHS’s 
position on the proper role of state and local officers in this context.”224 
It went on to specify the manner and limitations of state and local 
immigration enforcement desired by the Executive Branch.225 
The timing of other agency enforcement memoranda during the Bush 
and Obama Administrations was coincident with the rise in state and local 
enforcement efforts, although they did not directly address those 
subfederal enactments. In response to a crushing litigation load from 
removal proceedings, ICE’s principal legal advisor encouraged the use of 
prosecutorial discretion in late 2005226—the same year that witnessed a 
significant spike in state and local restrictionist legislation.227 Subsequent 
ICE memoranda in 2010 and 2011 clarified the agency’s priority order 
for investigation and apprehension, and counseled the use of 
prosecutorial discretion, detention, and enforcement consistent with those 
priorities.228 Again, those dates are significant moments in immigration 
federalism as they represented continued high levels of state and local 
enactments, such as SB 1070 in 2010 and its copycat legislation in other 
                                                                                                                     
 223. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., on 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion to Reg’l & Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, and Reg’l & Dist. 
Counsel of the Immigration & Naturalization Serv. (Nov. 17, 2000), 
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Meissner-2000-memo.pdf. 
 224. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ 
ASSISTANCE IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND RELATED MATTERS 1, http://www.dhs.gov/ 
guidance-state-and-local-governments-assistance-immigration-enforcement-and-related-matters 
(last updated July 9, 2015). 
 225. See id. at 10. 
 226. See Memorandum from William J. Howard to Chief Counsel, supra note 222. 
 227. See MICHAEL JONES-CORREA, MIGRATION POLICY INST., CONTESTED GROUND: 
IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2012), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/TCM-
UScasestudy.pdf. 
 228. Memorandum from John Morton to Field Office Dir., Special Agents in Charge, and 
Chief Counsel, supra note 222; Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, on Civil Immigration Enf’t: Priorities for the Apprehension, 
Detention, & Removal of Aliens to Employees of U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (June 30, 
2010). 
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states soon thereafter.  
These agency interventions have significant federalism consequences 
because state and local arrests and information regarding unlawfully 
present persons increases the volume and alters the characteristics of 
those in removal proceedings. As Professor Hiroshi Motomura 
persuasively argues, the arrest authority of state and local enforcement 
officers turns out to be the “discretion that matters” in immigration 
proceedings.229 In the end, the agency guidance memoranda did more 
than simply express an opinion about the effects of the state and local 
restrictionist trend. Although the federal agency memoranda could only 
control the actions of federal officers, the prominence of those agency 
priorities in Arizona helped curtail subfederal lawmaking. The majority 
of the Supreme Court accepted the premise, proffered by the U.S. 
Solicitor General, that state and local restrictionist laws, such as SB 1070, 
interfere with the priorities of federal immigration authorities and the 
manner in which those authorities chose to enforce immigration law.230 
In other words, those state and local laws tend to conflict or interfere with 
the way in which the Executive decided to execute congressional law, not 
with a federal statute as written.231  
Contemplating counterfactual possibilities further illustrates this 
power to seriously curtail or otherwise counteract state-level lawmaking. 
Consider that if Senator John McCain had won the Presidency in 2008, 
the federal government likely would not have sued Arizona for its 
immigration enforcement law. During his time as an Arizona Senator and 
during his presidential campaign, Senator McCain praised and defended 
SB 1070.232 Further, it is not clear that a McCain Administration would 
                                                                                                                     
 229. Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, 
State and Local Arrests, and the Civil–Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1822 (2011) (“In 
immigration law, however, the decision to make an arrest has been the discretion that matters.”). 
Because those state and local agents are not subject to oversight and control by ICE and federal 
enforcement agencies—and therefore not subject to administrative guidance and enforcement 
priorities—their apprehensions can load the immigration removal system with candidates that 
would not fit the Administration’s priorities. As such, even though the agency memoranda never 
expressly mention state and local enactments, it would appear that the concerns about the volume 
and characteristics of those placed in removal proceedings voiced in those memoranda were 
intended, at least in part, to blunt the effect of increased state and local enforcement policies. 
 230. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). 
 231. See Bulman-Pozen, Afterlife of American Federalism, supra note 21, at 1935–40 
(arguing that federalism cases are often separation of powers battles, with states either siding with 
the Executive or Congress). 
 232. Mike Sunnucks, McCain Voices Support for Immigrant Trespassing Bill, PHX. BUS. J. 
(Apr. 19, 2010, 1:25 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2010/04/19/daily3.html; 
see also Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, Reappraisal, supra note 43, at 2114 n.180, 2114–15 
(discussing forces that push one-time GOP moderates on immigration, such as Senator McCain, 
to positions more ideologically aligned with the rest of the party). 
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have produced the types of enforcement priority memoranda that 
informed the Government’s argument in Arizona. In this alternate 
universe, without the federal government, the case would have looked 
quite different. Of course, it remains quite possible that the Court would 
have reached the same decision if one of the other challenges from private 
parties and advocacy groups had wound its way through the trial and 
appeals process. But here, the President decided to bring to bear the 
resources and gravitas of the DOJ, with an argument that relied on 
executive agency priority setting, and helped increase the likelihood of 
success on the preemption claim against the Arizona law. Moreover, 
separate from litigation, a McCain or Romney Administration might have 
requested that Congress withhold funding from jurisdictions that resisted 
the federal government’s enforcement methods and may have taken a 
more favorable stance toward state and local enforcement cooperation by, 
for example, authorizing more or expanded 287(g) agreements.233  
B.  Co-opting and Obviating the Demand for State Action: Secure 
Communities and 287(g) 
In addition to stepping in to stop a state-level trend, the Executive may 
also co-opt state actors, at times with the possibility of placating them and 
obviating further decentralized policy making. Enforcement programs 
used by the Obama Administration, such as Secure Communities (S-
Comm) and 287(g) agreements, integrate states and localities into the 
federal enforcement scheme. By doing so, the Executive is able to co-opt 
state and local agencies for its own purposes, mitigating informational 
deficits and leveraging greater enforcement resources. In addition, the 
Executive might use such programs as a way of placating states and 
localities to try to stop them from independently enacting subfederal 
restrictionist policies beyond the Executive’s control. At the same time, 
however, the co-optation of states and localities can also limit federal 
power; the integration of subfederal agencies and officials into executive 
enforcement schemes provides critical opportunities for states and 
localities to push back against presidential policies. 
Illustrative of these dynamics is the now-superseded S-Comm 
program. S-Comm was an agency prerogative initially launched by 
President Bush’s DHS in 2007.234 The program was designed to include 
                                                                                                                     
 233. Under Section 287(g) of the INA, DHS can choose to authorize an agreement for a state 
or local agency to “receive delegated authority for immigration enforcement within their 
jurisdictions.” See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act: Fact Sheet, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, http://www.ice.gov/
factsheets/287g (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
 234. Editorial, The ‘Secure Communities’ Illusion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/opinion/the-secure-communities-illusion.html. 
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state and local law enforcement officials in immigration enforcement.235 
S-Comm was neither created by Congress nor specifically provided for 
in any federal statute. It was a purely administrative measure concocted 
by executive branch officials to leverage the superior information and 
manpower of state and local law enforcement agencies.236 
Fundamentally, S-Comm integrated state and local enforcement agencies 
into the federal immigration enforcement scheme, but it did so on terms 
acceptable to the Executive’s enforcement apparatus and priorities.  
Although it is clear that S-Comm was not solely a response to state 
and local activity, its timing is instructive. Initially introduced as a pilot 
program in 2008, the Executive developed S-Comm in the context of the 
exponential uptick in state and local restrictionist legislation.237 State and 
local involvement began in earnest in 2005 and increased in frequency 
and scope for several years, culminating with the passage of Arizona’s 
SB 1070 in 2010 and copycat legislation in other states.238 One of the 
hallmarks of such state legislation was the increased involvement of local 
law enforcement in the investigation and apprehension of unauthorized 
migrants in efforts to bolster federal enforcement efforts. Soon after, the 
Administration, through DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, clarified that 
S-Comm was a mandatory program that it would roll out to every 
jurisdiction in the United States, without the opportunity for state and 
local opt-out.239  
                                                                                                                     
 235. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 93 
(2013). 
 236. See id. at 88 (noting that ICE implemented the program). As per the program, every 
time a local law enforcement official entered the name of a person in her custody into federal 
crime databases to check for criminal history or outstanding warrants, that information was 
automatically forwarded to immigration databases. Id. at 94. That immigration database query 
then notified local law enforcement and ICE regarding whether the person in custody was 
potentially unlawfully present. ICE retained the option to prosecute the individual. Id. at 94–95. 
To assist the federal enforcement effort, ICE would generally request that the local jurisdiction 
hold the individual for some period of time awaiting his transfer into federal custody. Id. at 95. 
 237. See AARTI KOHLI ET AL., CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, 
SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1 
(2011); see also Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1770–73 (2015) (describing 
S-Comm as a “no citizenship list”). 
 238. See Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, Reappraisal, supra note 43, at 2108–12 (presenting 
a politicized model to explain subfederal policy proliferation on immigration); Ramakrishnan & 
Gulasekaram, Importance of the Political, supra note 43, at 1442–48 (illustrating a new theory 
explaining state and local involvement in immigration regulation). 
 239. Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama’s Immigration Strategy, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/us/06immigration.html (noting that 
DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano clarified that S-Comm is mandatory); see also Interview with a 
national immigrant advocacy organization with access to White House Strategy meeting (Jan. 22, 
2015) (notes and interview audio recording on file with authors); Memorandum from Riah 
Ramlogan, Deputy Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, on Secure 
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Indeed, the Executive seems to have designed S-Comm with state 
enforcement schemes in mind. First, S-Comm enabled the 
Administration to co-opt state enforcement systems on federal terms, 
favoring prioritized enforcement over more universal enforcement 
schemes advanced by Arizona.240 In addition, senior administration 
officials saw S-Comm as blunting momentum for more state enforcement 
legislation after Arizona by satisfying state and local demands for greater 
immigration enforcement.241 Although the implementation of S-Comm 
did not stop all subfederal attempts at immigration enforcement, it may 
have slowed the drive for state and local enforcement in other 
jurisdictions that were considering their own responses to unauthorized 
migration. 
If the rise of S-Comm tells a story about the Executive Branch’s 
attempt to control and manage a state-level trend, while also leveraging 
local resources, S-Comm’s recent demise illustrates the reciprocal 
dynamic of state-level influence over executive enforcement decisions. 
As S-Comm rolled out and covered nearly every jurisdiction in the 
country, several counties and states resisted its implementation.242 
Although they could not refuse to share information regarding unlawfully 
present persons in their custody, these jurisdictions nevertheless refused 
to honor ICE requests to hold those individuals while awaiting transfer to 
federal custody.243 State TRUST Acts and county detainer-resistance 
policies limited the number and nature of crimes for which any ICE holds 
would be honored.244 This state and local resistance left its mark. 
As part of his executive actions on immigration, President Obama 
dismantled S-Comm in November of 2014 and replaced it with the 
                                                                                                                     
Cmtys.—Mandatory in 2013 to Beth N. Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. Immigration & 
Customs Enf’t (Oct. 2, 2010) (indicating that S-Comm will be mandatory in 2013). 
 240. Interview, supra note 239. 
 241. See MOTOMURA, supra note 35, at 79 (“Express federal authorization has significantly 
expanded the state and local role in direct enforcement of federal immigration law. This trend has 
helped to satisfy state and local pressures to get tough on unauthorized migration by getting 
directly involved in immigration enforcement, even if the vehicles for a state and local role are 
limited and seem to leave federal authorities in the driver’s seat.”); see also David Martin, 
Principal Deputy Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S.-Mexico Migration Dialogue: 
Migration, Repatriation, and Protection: Policies and Options (Nov. 17, 2010). 
 242. Preston, supra note 239; Jessica Vaughn, Obama’s Catch-and-Release Policies Blunt 
Secure Communities, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (May 8, 2012), http://www.cis.org/vaughan/ 
obamas-catch-and-release-policies-blunt-secure-communities. 
 243. See Vaughn, supra note 242. 
 244. See, e.g., California TRUST Act, A.B. 4, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) 
(requiring certain conditions to be met before honoring ICE requests); SANTA CLARA CTY. BD. OF 
SUPERVISORS POLICY MANUAL 121–22 § 3.54 (2012) (detailing the circumstances under which the 
county of Santa Clara would honor ICE requests). 
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Priority Enforcement Program (PEP).245 Two aspects of this policy 
change are significant. First, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson specifically 
referenced the tide of state and local resistance to S-Comm in his 
memorandum discontinuing the program: “Governors, mayors, and state 
and local enforcement officials around the country have increasingly 
refused to cooperate with the program, and many have issued executive 
orders or signed laws prohibiting such cooperation.”246 According to the 
memo, although DHS still believed in the program’s goals, state and local 
resistance had irreparably tarnished S-Comm’s image.247 
Second, the enforcement program that replaced S-Comm shares some 
aspects of the state-level TRUST Acts enacted to resist the Executive 
Branch’s co-optation of state and local enforcement agents with S-
Comm. The PEP program enumerates categories of crime for which the 
federal enforcement agency will seek transfer of custody from a local 
agency, and it replaces requests for detention with requests for 
notification from the local law enforcement of the pending release of an 
individual.248 The dependence of the Executive on these state-level 
agencies for critical information regarding unlawfully present aliens 
allowed those state-level agencies to successfully challenge and change 
the Executive’s enforcement strategy. The nimbleness of an executive 
branch enforcement system—as opposed to a congressionally mandated 
one—allowed the President to respond accordingly. It remains unclear, 
however, if the programs operate differently in practice given that they 
both require local agents to supply information to federal enforcement 
authorities.249 
Similarly, 287(g) agreements provide opportunities for the Executive 
to integrate states and localities into immigration enforcement, thereby 
obviating the impetus for independent subfederal activity.250 Unlike S-
Comm or PEP, the Executive Branch did not initiate the 287(g) program; 
rather, it is a congressional creation.251 However, the statutory section 
                                                                                                                     
 245. NAT’L. IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., PRIORITY ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: WHY ‘PEP’ 
DOESN’T FIX S-COMM’S FAILINGS 1 (2015), http://www.nilc.org/PEPnotafix.html. 
 246. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on 
Secure Cmtys. to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (Nov. 
20, 2014). 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
https://www.ice.gov/pep (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
 249. See Aura Bogado, Goodbye, Secure Communities. Hello, Priority Enforcement 
Program, COLORLINES (Nov. 21, 2014, 8:57 PM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2014/11
/goodbye_secure_communities_hello_priority_enforcement_program.html. 
 250. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012). 
 251. MATT A. MAYER, HERITAGE FOUND., WHITE HOUSE TAKES WRONG STEP WITH 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1 (2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/
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provides a critical role for the Executive. As per the scheme, local 
jurisdictions desirous of aiding immigration enforcement may enter into 
an agreement with the federal government.252 On the federal side, the 
Attorney General and the DOJ have the discretion to broker and enter into 
the agreement.253 The agreement provides for federal training of local 
officers and authorizes those officers to engage in certain forms of 
immigration enforcement.254 Importantly, the Executive always retains 
the discretion over whether to enter into, extend, or rescind its agreements 
with state and local law enforcement.255  
Although enacted in 1996, the provision and agreements pursuant to 
it remained fallow until 2001.256 After September 11, 2001, the number 
of 287(g) agreements began to steadily increase.257 As the exponential 
rise in state and local restrictionist legislation began to proliferate in 2005, 
so did the Administration’s willingness to enter into 287(g) agreements. 
Indeed, the DOJ touted the 287(g) program as the proper way for states 
and localities to participate in immigration enforcement.258 Also, the 
Executive can and has used 287(g) as a tool to either attempt to forestall 
state actions or to sanction states and localities for conduct ultra vires to 
the Executive’s desired enforcement prerogatives. Indeed, one study of 
287(g) implementation revealed that DHS had only approved forty-six 
percent of applications by 2008.259 More recently, the federal government 
has discontinued several of its agreements, including those with Arizona 
jurisdictions that acted out of step with the Administration’s enforcement 
priorities and, in the DOJ’s assessment, abused the terms of their 
participation.260 Thus, even though Congress created the 287(g) program, 
its implementation has left significant discretionary power in the hands 
of the Executive to manage and discipline state and local law enforcement 
                                                                                                                     
removal-of-287g-local-immigration-enforcement-weakens-immigration-policy. 
 252. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. § 1357(g)(2). 
 255. See id. § 1357(g)(1). 
 256. JESSICA VAUGHN & JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR., CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE 
287(G) PROGRAM: PROTECTING HOME TOWNS AND HOMELAND 3–4 (2009), 
http://www.cis.org/287greport. 
 257. See id. at 4 (indicating that the 287(g) program became more prevalent after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks). 
 258. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 201, at 45–46 (arguing in support of 
287(g)). 
 259. See Tom K. Wong, 287(g) and the Politics of Interior Immigration Control in the 
United States: Explaining Local Cooperation with Federal Immigration Authorities, 38 J. ETHNIC 
& MIGRATION STUD. 737, 746 (2012) (“Of the 89 counties that have applied, 41 have had their 
applications approved while 28 counties have been rejected.”). 
 260. See Jeremy Duda, Homeland Security Revokes 287(g) Agreements in Arizona, ARIZ. 
CAPITOL TIMES (June 25, 2012, 4:37 PM), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2012/06/25/homeland-
security-revokes-287g-immigration-check-agreements-in-arizona/. 
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participation. 
C.  Catalyzing State-Level Policy Making: Licensing and Deferred 
Action 
The third—and least appreciated, but perhaps most powerful—aspect 
of presidential immigration federalism is the manner in which executive 
action can catalyze state and local policy making. In doing so, states and 
localities may act as the legislative agents for the President’s policy 
vision. In this dynamic, the Executive harnesses the power of state and 
local lawmaking to bypass Congress in attempt to fashion a national 
immigration policy. In the dynamic highlighted here, state and local 
action enables and entrenches the Executive’s policy preference. 
However, as suggested in Part III, federal executive action may also spur 
state and local opposition, whereby federalism interactions become vital 
levers in disputes over excesses in exercises of executive power. 
This Section describes two instances in which federal executive 
decisions under President Obama spurred state-level lawmaking. In the 
first instance, the DOJ intervened in a California state court lawsuit in a 
manner that influenced state legislation on professional licensing for 
unauthorized migrants. The second, more prominent example involves 
the ripple effects at the state level of the President’s DACA program. 
Specifically, DACA spurred a series of state-level policy conversations 
that quickly led to more wide-ranging changes on driver’s license 
programs and other policies affecting undocumented immigrants, 
including those not covered by DACA.261  
The first illustration of the dynamic of catalyzing local action is 
evidenced by the Executive’s involvement in and the state legislative 
response to In re Garcia.262 At issue in the case was whether California’s 
Committee of Bar Examiners could admit an undocumented applicant to 
the state bar without violating federal law.263 The relevant federal statute 
prohibits states from providing any state or local benefit, such as a 
professional license, to an undocumented person unless the state provides 
                                                                                                                     
 261. To be sure, there are instances in which executive action has spurred state-level action 
inconsistent with, and in opposition to, the executive vision. One instance already described was 
state responses to S-Comm, which contributed to the program’s discontinuance—at least under 
the name S-Comm. These are also a key part of the complete story of presidential immigration 
federalism, and the next Section addresses such resistance more fully by arguing that states may 
act as a check on the Executive Branch. But leaving aside instances of dissent and challenge to 
presidential authority for the moment, this Article’s focus here is more acutely on the types of 
executive action that have spurred state-level lawmaking consistent with the Executive’s vision 
for immigration policy.  
 262. 315 P.3d 117 (Cal. 2014). 
 263. Id. at 121. 
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for it by an affirmative enactment.264 Garcia argued that although the 
California legislature had not passed any law allowing undocumented 
persons access to the state bar, the California Supreme Court’s ruling 
could substitute for the “enactment” necessary to satisfy the federal law’s 
requirement.265  
Although the DOJ was not a party, it submitted an amicus brief in 
response to an invitation from the California Supreme Court.266 Again, 
this form of federal–state interaction is distinctly executive. Not only is 
the decision to respond a discretionary one for the DOJ, the California 
Supreme Court could not similarly ask Congress to elaborate on the 
meaning of its statute. In its submission, the federal government opposed 
Garcia’s application on the basis that the state could not grant a 
professional license to an unauthorized immigrant without an act of the 
California legislature.267 At oral argument, the court appeared solicitous 
of the federal government’s view and sympathetic to its argument.268 
Importantly, the DOJ’s filing expressly noted that federal law provided 
California the opportunity to enact a law to confer a professional license 
to people such as Garcia.269  
A scant three weeks after the oral argument and before the court 
rendered a decision, the California legislature passed a law that was 
precisely the type of affirmative legislative act on which the DOJ’s brief 
focused.270 The new law expressly provided that the state may issue bar 
                                                                                                                     
 264. 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012). 
 265. See Opening Brief of Applicant at 2, 15, 18–21, In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (No. 
S202512) (arguing that the California State Bar’s rule to carry out an amendment to the California 
Bar Act satisfied § 1621). 
 266. Order, In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (No. S202512) (en banc), 
www.courts.ca.gov/documents/5-16-order-issuing-OSC.pdf.; Application & Proposed Brief for 
Amicus Curiae the United States at 1, In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117 (No. S202512) [hereinafter 
United States’ Garcia Amicus Brief]. 
 267. United States’ Garcia Amicus Brief, supra note 266, at 14. The Solicitor General’s 
filing rejected Garcia’s contention that the California Supreme Court ruling would meet the 
requirement. See id. at 9. 
 268. See Oral Argument at 52:00–57:00, In re Garcia, 315 P.3d 117, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uZEgYFN-EEk (colloquy between Justice Goodwin Liu and 
an attorney for the United States). 
 269. United States’ Garcia Amicus Brief, supra note 266, at 12 (“Moreover, as this Court 
noted in its Order, Congress has accommodated state interests by allowing States to enact 
measures that would provide benefits to unlawfully present aliens, and the State could do so here.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 270. See A.B. 1024, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (codified as amended at CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6064 (West 2015)); Adriana Maestas, Analysis: California Bills Point to 
Broader Inclusion of Undocumented Immigrants, NBC LATINO (Sept. 14, 2013, 10:35 AM), 
http://nbclatino.com/2013/09/14/victory-for-immigrants-in-california-legislature-bills-to-
license-undocumented-lawyers-and-drivers-pass/ (noting bipartisan support of the bill). 
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licenses to unauthorized migrants.271 In the wake of the new law, the 
DOJ’s supplemental briefing confirmed the Executive’s position that 
federal law no longer precluded the state’s conferral of a bar license.272 
In its ruling a few months later, the California Supreme Court granted 
Garcia’s application.273 In the wake of California’s legislative move to 
expressly comply with the federal statute and the DOJ’s position, the 
Florida legislature followed suit.274 With a similar action from an 
undocumented bar applicant, the Florida legislature also passed a law 
clarifying that undocumented bar applicants may receive professional 
licenses.275 Since the In re Garcia decision, California has moved beyond 
just bar membership. Recently, California Governor Jerry Brown signed 
laws stating that unauthorized immigrants could receive state licenses in 
several professions.276 
In recognizing the role of the Executive Branch in state decisions on 
professional licensing, one should be careful not to overclaim. There is 
no indication that the President necessarily preferred to have states 
provide professional licenses to unauthorized migrants; his first 
preference likely would have been broader congressional legislation. At 
the same time, this preferred solution was not an option given the 
congressional stalemate on immigrant legalization. One also should be 
careful not to overstate the federal government’s role in producing a state 
response. It is possible that the state legislature was considering such a 
move well before oral argument.277 However, the DOJ’s briefing and 
apparent influence in oral argument seems, at a minimum, to have 
                                                                                                                     
 271. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6064(b). 
 272. See Letter from Daniel Tenny, Counsel for the United States, to Frank A. McGuire, 
Clerk, Sup. Ct. of Cal. (Nov. 12, 2013). 
 273. In re Garcia, 315 P.3d at 134. 
 274. See Jan Pudlow, Governor Signs Undocumented Attorney Bill, FLA. BAR NEWS (June 1, 
2014), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf/RSSFeed/52B54E465C469EE7
85257CDD0044AFD4. 
 275. FLA. STAT. § 454.021(3) (2015); see also Pudlow, supra note 274 (reporting that the 
Florida Supreme Court opinion initially denying the bar license a few months earlier had specified 
that if the Florida legislature mimicked California’s legislative efforts, then the applicant would 
be eligible for admission). It is worth noting that in New York, however, the high court ruled that 
the state court’s ruling on bar admission would suffice to meet the “affirmative enactment” 
requirement of federal law and did not require the state legislature to enact a separate law. In re 
Vargas, 10 N.Y.S.3d 579, 582, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
 276. Alexia Fernández Campbell, How California Is Making Life Easier for Undocumented 
Immigrants, NAT’L J. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/population-2043/How-
California-Is-Making-Life-Easier-Undocumented-Immigrants. 
 277. In fact, California Assembly Bill 1024 was initially introduced in February 2013, a few 
months before briefing and argument in In re Garcia. See AB-1024: History, CAL. LEGISLATIVE 
INFO., http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB1024 
(last updated Oct. 5, 2013). 
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provided urgency to such state action.278  
Perhaps the most dramatic and consequential example of presidential 
action catalyzing state-level lawmaking is the ripple effect caused by 
DACA. Announced by President Obama in a Rose Garden ceremony in 
Summer 2012279 and implemented by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, DACA is unmistakably associated with the Obama 
Administration and the President personally.280 As per the program, 
unauthorized immigrant youth who fit several criteria may apply for three 
years of deferred prosecution from federal authorities.281 Those who 
receive DACA status are also eligible to receive an Employment 
Authorization Document (EAD), allowing them to seek employment 
without violating federal law.282 As a purely administrative program, 
DACA recipients are lawfully present for the period of deferred action, 
but they are not granted lawful status, which only Congress can provide 
through legislation.283  
At the time the Obama Administration conceived DACA, it does not 
appear that the Administration was purposefully attempting to change 
state-level policy. Indeed, federalism considerations appeared nowhere 
near the Executive’s radar.284 As contemporary observers note, the 
                                                                                                                     
 278. Activity on Assembly Bill 1024 accelerated considerably after the oral argument in In 
re Garcia. Within a week of argument, the bill was referred from the appropriations committee to 
the originating committees and, from there, passed on to the assembly for a vote. See id. 
 279. See Obama, supra note 2. 
 280. Indeed, the program faces a legal challenge from rank and file members of ICE who 
argue that the agency priority memoranda and DACA violate federal law. According to their suit, 
federal law obligates them to enforce immigration laws against all unauthorized persons they 
encounter, regardless of whether those individuals fall within the Administration’s priority 
categories or designation of DACA recipients. The court dismissed the claims for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that neither the ICE agents nor the 
State of Mississippi proved concrete or particularized injury to give them standing in the suit. 
Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Crane v. Johnson, 783 
F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 281. Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children 
and with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent 
Residents to León Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf. 
 282. DHS Extends Eligibility for Employment Authorization to Certain H-4 Dependent 
Spouses of H-1B Nonimmigrants Seeking Employment-Based Lawful Permanent Residence, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/news/dhs-
extends-eligibility-employment-authorization-certain-h-4-dependent-spouses-h-1b-nonimmigrants-
seeking-employment-based-lawful-permanent-residence. 
 283. See Memorandum from Jeh C. Johnson to León Rodriguez, supra note 281. 
 284. The lack of attention to state legislative consequences of DACA was also confirmed in 
our interviews with national pro-integration organizations invited to White House strategy 
sessions. Interview with federated organization (Jan. 23, 2015) (notes and recording of interview 
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primary reasons for the President’s move on DACA lay squarely at the 
national level, including a mix of political and policy concerns. The 
political rationale for DACA related to the 2012 election: the President 
was contending with low voter enthusiasm among Latino voters, and 
DACA held the promise of increasing the President’s approval ratings 
among this key reelection constituency.285 The policy rationale behind 
DACA was to induce congressional legislation on immigration.286  
Prior to DACA’s implementation, Congress had considered but never 
passed either comprehensive immigration reform or stand-alone 
immigration measures on several different occasions during the George 
W. Bush and Obama Presidencies.287 In 2010, the DREAM Act—
proposed federal legislation that would have benefited the same 
population as DACA and would have included a pathway to lawful 
status—was defeated in Congress.288 Finally, even a pared-down version 
of the DREAM Act (one championed by Senator Marco Rubio that would 
have provided work authorization but no pathway to citizenship) failed 
to gain congressional support in early 2012.289 
The desire to prod Congress into legislative solutions was clearly on 
the President’s mind when he announced the DACA program. After the 
President mentioned the key features of DACA, he noted: 
 
                                                                                                                     
on file with authors); Interview with national organization (Jan. 10, 2015) (notes and recording of 
interview on file with authors). 
 285. On the electoral pressures and protest tactics by DREAM activists, see John Ingold, 
Immigration Activists Stage Sit-in at Denver Obama Office, DENVER POST (June 5, 2012, 9:47 PM), 
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_20791243/immigration-activists-stage-sit-at-denver-obama-office. 
Surveys after DACA validated the political benefits that President Obama received from DACA. See, 
e.g., Elizabeth Llorente, Latinos Give Obama Higher Ratings on Immigration, Fox News Latino Poll 
Says, FOX NEWS LATINO (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/09/20/latinos-give-obama-higher-ratings-on-
immigration-fox-news-latino-poll-says/. 
 286. See Rebecca Kaplan, Obama to Immigration Critics in Congress: “Pass a bill,” CBS 
NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014, 8:30 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-move-to-shield-
millions-from-deportation-is-lawful/. 
 287. Mark Knoller, The Last President Who Couldn’t Get Congress to Act on Immigration, 
CBS NEWS (Nov. 21, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-last-president-who-
couldnt-get-congress-to-act-on-immigration/; Chuck Todd, Mark Murray & Carrie Dann, Why 
Immigration Reform Died in Congress, NBC NEWS (July 1, 2014, 9:09 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/why-immigration-reform-died-congress-n145276. 
 288. See Obama, supra note 2. 
 289. Neil King, Jr., Rubio Says Own Dream Act Derailed for Now, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE 
(June 18, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/06/18/rubio-says-own-dream-act-
derailed-for-now/; Marco Rubio Talks Immigration, Dream Act, Amnesty, CBS NEWS (June 15, 
2012, 9:17 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/marco-rubio-talks-immigration-dream-act-
amnesty/. 
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Precisely because this is temporary, Congress needs to act. 
There’s still time for Congress to pass the DREAM Act this 
year, because these kids deserve to plan their lives in more 
than two-year increments. And we still need to pass 
comprehensive immigration reform that addresses our 21st-
century economic and security needs . . . . 290 
Despite the President’s policy wishes, DACA failed to induce 
congressional action. In 2013, the Senate passed its version of a 
comprehensive immigration reform bill, but the Senate bill floundered in 
the House.291 Since then, Congress has taken no action on immigration, 
with the exception of several members questioning and criticizing the 
President’s DACA program and approach to immigration enforcement. 
In fact, key members of Congress have reassured the public that the 
federal legislature will not act on immigration as long as Obama is 
President.292  
Although DACA has thus far failed to spur congressional immigration 
reform, it has nonetheless catalyzed significant changes in state-level 
policy.293 Moreover, the integrationist momentum in subfederal policy 
making galvanized by DACA appears to be the precise policy outcome 
opposed by the congressional members who defeated the several 
comprehensive reform proposals and DREAM Act attempts over the past 
fourteen years. The starkest example of this policy shift is state driver’s 
license policies post-DACA. Federal law in the form of the REAL ID Act 
of 2005 maintains minimum standards for state-issued licenses and 
identification cards if individuals are going to use those cards for 
particular purposes, such as access to federal buildings or certain public 
                                                                                                                     
 290. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 
15, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/06/15/president-obama-
speaks-department-homeland-security-immigration-an#transcript. 
 291. See Aaron Blake, Boehner Closes Door on House-Senate Immigration Panel, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 13, 2013, 5:03 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2013/11/13/boehner-closes-door-on-house-senate-immigration-panel/. 
 292. See Michael C. Bender, Boehner Stalls on Immigration with Focus on Obamacare, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 7, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-
06/boehner-stalls-immigration-bill-citing-lack-of-trust (“[I]t will be difficult to pass a bill this 
year because fellow Republicans don’t trust President Barack Obama, whose term ends in 2017, 
to enforce the changes.”). 
 293. As discussed below, factors such as state partisanship and share of the Latino electorate 
can help explain where driver’s licenses beyond DACA licenses ultimately passed. However, 
these factors do not explain the timing of why driver’s license efforts remained dormant until 
2013. Other factors, such as changes in funding from national philanthropies, followed the 
announcement of DACA and, in some significant ways, was related to helping ensure successful 
implementation of DACA across all states. See PRATHEEPAN GULASEKRAM & S. KARTHICK 
RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 144–45 (2015). 
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benefits, or for airline travel.294 REAL ID has yet to be fully implemented 
nationwide, but most states comply with its prohibitions on providing 
licenses to those without lawful status.295 In the wake of DACA, nearly 
every state clarified its policies to include DACA recipients’ eligibility 
for driver’s licenses.296 This consequence is not too surprising, however, 
given that REAL ID already provided some leeway to states to provide 
licenses to recipients of deferred action.297 Using this statutory discretion, 
even prior to 2012, many states maintained a policy of allowing 
undocumented persons with deferred action and an EAD to apply for a 
driver’s license.  
More notable and surprising, however, is the broader momentum 
created by DACA on state driver’s licenses. Unauthorized immigrants 
without deferred action or EADs were not eligible for driving privileges 
in the overwhelming majority of states in early 2012.298 In the several 
years leading up to DACA’s announcement, most of the states that 
previously issued licenses to undocumented persons repealed those 
policies under the combined weight of popular outcry following the 
September 11 attacks and implementation of REAL ID.299 From 2003 to 
2010, seven of the ten states that previously granted driving privileges to 
                                                                                                                     
 294. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 and 49 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 295. See JANICE KEPHART, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, REAL ID IMPLEMENTATION 
EMBRACED BY 41 STATES (2011), http://cis.org/real-id-terrorist-abuse. 
 296. Access to Driver’s Licenses for Immigrant Youth Granted DACA, NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
LAW CTR., http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses2.html (last updated May 31, 2015). Notably, 
two states—Arizona and Nebraska—bucked that trend, although their attempted denial of licenses 
to DACA recipients was subsequently challenged in federal court. Id. In Arizona’s case, it was in 
fact later struck down, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Arizona’s application for stay on 
appeal. Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2014) (granting a 
preliminary injunction to petitioners and ruling that plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success 
on their claim that Arizona’s denial of licenses to DACA recipients violated the Equal Protection 
Clause), stay denied, 135 S. Ct. 889 (2014). In January 2015, the district court permanently 
enjoined the state’s policy of denying licenses to DACA recipients. Access to Driver’s Licenses 
for Immigrant Youth Granted DACA, supra. Nebraska initially resisted the trend, spurring a 
lawsuit challenging that resistance. Id. However, in May 2015, the legislature—over the 
Governor’s veto—changed its policy to allow DACA recipients to receive licenses. Id. Currently, 
DACA recipients in all fifty states and the District of Columbia are eligible to apply for driver’s 
licenses. Id. 
 297. REAL ID Act, § 202(c)(2)(B)(viii) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note); see also 
GULASEKRAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 293, at 252 n.58 (“Importantly, the federal 
government has delayed full implementation of REAL ID, and has extended the deadline for state 
compliance several times. Several states have expressly stated their intention to continue resisting 
REAL ID requirements.”). 
 298. See KEPHART, supra note 295. 
 299. See id. 
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undocumented immigrants stopped doing so.300 
The Obama Administration’s implementation of DACA helped 
reverse that trend. In the two years following DACA’s implementation, 
twelve states, along with Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico, changed 
their policies to provide licenses regardless of lawful immigration 
status.301 Of those fourteen jurisdictions, nine changed their policies in 
the first eighteen months following DACA, at least partly as a response 
to the changed policy climate created by the presidential policy.302 
Further, New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts are considering a 
similar change.303 
Some might explain this reversal by pointing to the growing political 
clout of Latino voters or Democrats’ increasing control of state 
governments. However, our statistical analysis of these changes in state 
policies on driver’s licenses indicates that neither played a decisive role. 
First, many states that expanded driver’s license access (including 
Connecticut, Vermont, Maryland, and Washington) did not have sizable 
Latino electorates.304 Additionally, while nearly all the states that 
expanded access to driver’s licenses had Democrat-controlled 
legislatures, these same states had Democrat-controlled legislatures prior 
to 2012 but did not pass legislation granting driver’s licenses to 
unauthorized immigrants.305 Once states began the process of allowing 
                                                                                                                     
 300. States that repealed their policies granting undocumented immigrants’ driver’s licenses 
from 2003 to 2010 include California, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, and 
Tennessee. MICHAEL CSERE, CONN. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, ISSUANCE OF DRIVER’S 
LICENSES TO UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 3 (2013), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/pdf/2013-
R-0194.pdf. 
 301. States and jurisdictions currently allowing, or preparing to allow, undocumented 
persons to apply for driver’s licenses are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New Mexico, Nevada, Puerto Rico, Utah, Vermont, and 
Washington. See State Laws Providing Access to Driver’s Licenses or Cards Regardless of 
Immigration Status, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=979 
(last updated July 2015). Note that New Mexico, Utah, and Washington already permitted the 
practice prior to the enactment of DACA in 2012. Id. 
 302. Id. (showing the date signed and effective date for each state law providing access to 
licenses regardless of lawful immigration status). The Obama Administration enacted DACA on 
June 15, 2012. Frequently Asked Questions: The Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., http://old.nilc.org/FAQ
deferredactionyouth.html (last updated Aug. 14, 2015). 
 303. Notably, Oregon, during the 2014 midterm elections, rejected a driver’s license 
proposal in a referendum after the legislature had initially passed the bill. Stephen Dinan, Oregon 
Voters Reject Licenses for Illegals; Immigration a Losing Issue for Dems in 2014 Elections, 
WASH. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/5/immigration-
losing-issue-democrats-2014-midterm-el/. 
 304. Statistical analysis on file with authors and can be requested from Karthick 
Ramakrishnan. 
 305. Id. 
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driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries, however, it became less of a 
stretch to extend that privilege to other state residents without lawful 
status.  
The case of California is perhaps most emblematic of how DACA 
tipped the balance in favor of expanded driver’s license policies. 
Governor Brown signaled his opposition to driver’s licenses for 
undocumented immigrants as late as February 2012, even as Democrats 
controlled both chambers of the legislature and the Governor’s office.306 
Very soon after the implementation of DACA, however, Governor 
Brown’s position began to shift. He signed legislation in September 2012, 
extending driver’s licenses to DACA beneficiaries,307 and one year later, 
he signed a bill granting driver’s licenses to unauthorized immigrants 
more generally.308 Importantly, the political context internal to California 
did not shift appreciably between February 2012 and October 2013—the 
Democrats controlled the governorship and both houses of the California 
legislature during the entire period,309 and Latinos had a strong presence 
in the electorate and the legislature.310 DACA was the catalyst that 
changed the policy dynamic on driver’s licenses, breaking an impasse 
that had been in place for more than a decade. 
More broadly, in contexts beyond driver’s licenses, state and local 
policies have become much more integrationist since DACA’s 
implementation. Continuing a trend that started before DACA, more 
jurisdictions are providing or considering providing municipal 
identification cards for their residents, a policy primarily aimed at 
undocumented persons.311 States have continued the trend of easing 
educational access and financing for undocumented students attending 
institutions of higher learning.312 States and localities became bolder and 
more conspicuous in their attempts to resist federal enforcement and 
                                                                                                                     
 306. Patrick McGreevy, Assemblyman Tries Again on Licenses for Illegal Immigrants, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/25/local/la-me-drivers-license-
20120225 (“Gov. Jerry Brown has voiced opposition to such licenses.”). 
 307. A.B. 2189, 2012–2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
 308. A.B. 60, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
 309. Compare 2012 State and Legislative Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/legiscontrol_
2012.pdf (showing that the Democratic Party controlled California’s legislature and politics), with 
2013 State and Legislative Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/legiscontrol_2013.pdf (same). 
 310. See Seth Motel & Eileen Patten, Latinos in the 2012 Election: California, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/10/01/latinos-in-the-2012-
election-california/ (“The Hispanic population in California is the largest in the nation.”). 
 311. See Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, Understanding Immigration Federalism, supra 
note 13 (listing several state and local integrationist trends). 
 312. Id. 
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decline to cooperate with federal immigration authorities.313 Indeed, the 
state of New York even went so far to consider a state citizenship bill that 
would provide a form of state membership to state residents regardless of 
immigration status.314  
Thus, presidential action on immigration can have important knock-
on effects on state legislation affecting immigrants. In some instances, 
such as the extension of driver’s license privileges, the effects may be 
direct. In other cases, such as the extension of in-state tuition and health 
benefits, the effects may be more indirect, with presidential action serving 
more as a catalyst to action, thus tipping the scales at the state and local 
level toward those pushing for greater immigrant integration. Of course, 
more recent developments, such as state resistance to the resettlement of 
Syrian refugees,315 shows that presidential action in the immigration field 
can also spark state resistance, a possibility that we explore in more detail 
in the next section (III.B). 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT’S ROLE IN IMMIGRATION 
FEDERALISM 
So far, this Article’s exploration of the President’s role in immigration 
federalism has described his distinct influence on state-level policies, 
both historically and in contemporary immigration policy. This Article 
focuses on the breadth and types of present-day executive action with 
state-level consequences because of the current political climate on 
immigration. For nearly two decades, Congress has not enacted 
significant immigration legislation.316 In that time, however, the 
undocumented population of the United States has grown to the point 
where one out of every three noncitizens is potentially subject to 
deportation.317 In our prior work, we theorized an in-depth political cause, 
embedded in party politics and the U.S. federalist system, for this 
                                                                                                                     
 313. Id. 
 314. Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. 
L. REV. 869, 905 (2015) (defending the constitutionality and desirability of a state citizenship 
bill). 
 315. Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Karthick Ramakrishnan, The Law is Clear: States Cannot 
Reject Syrian Refugees, WASH. POST: POSTEVERYTHING (Nov. 19, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/11/19/the-law-is-clear-states-cannot-
reject-syrian-refugees/. 
 316. Scott C. Hodges, Note, Twenty-Hour Detention Based on Reasonable Suspicion Is Not 
a “Minimal Intrusion”: A Case For Amending Arizona's SB 1070, 7 PHX. L. REV. 411, 418–19 
(2013). 
 317. Cox, supra note 25, at 56; see also Andrea Caumont, Unauthorized Immigration, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR.: HISPANIC TRENDS (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/
23/unauthorized-immigration/ (noting that “[u]nauthorized immigrants made up 28% of all U.S. 
immigrants in 2012”). 
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congressional intransigence.318 Thus, with dismal prospects for a 
congressional fix to the nation’s immigration concerns, the President and 
the states become even more central to the definition of national 
immigration policy. 
Part III begins with a preliminary exploration of the importance of the 
President’s distinct role in immigration federalism. First, Section III.A 
considers the doctrinal consequences of increased presidential 
involvement in immigration federalism, including the concerns raised by 
Arizona. The Supreme Court’s current doctrinal framework and stylized 
understanding of federalism are ill-suited to evaluate the increasingly 
robust executive presence in immigration federalism. Moreover, courts 
and commentators should pay closer heed to the possibility that 
immigration federalism in practice can operate as immigration separation 
of powers and immigration nationalism. To that end, Section III.B 
showcases the possibility that states and localities can provide a 
meaningful but limited check on executive power, making immigration 
federalism a key component of separation of powers disputes. Section 
III.C then considers the ways in which the President can utilize states to 
entrench policies, making it more difficult for Congress to uproot the 
Executive’s vision and setting the stage for de facto national policy.  
A.  Reevaluating Preemption 
In the first type of executive intervention—litigation attempting to 
curtail state-level activity—the President’s immigration federalism 
power is twofold: First, he can calibrate federal enforcement priorities in 
a manner distinct from state and local authorities. Second, he can decide 
whether to bring the legal resources of the federal government to bear in 
a suit against state and local lawmaking. Arizona illustrates both concerns 
and suggests the inadequacy of current preemption theory to capture 
immigration federalism. Additionally, the second type of executive 
intervention—co-optation of subfederal enforcement resources—
simultaneously increases state and local involvement in immigration 
while solidifying the federal authority necessary to prevail in immigration 
federalism suits.  
The Executive’s enforcement priorities and methodology appear to 
have been the dispositive difference in determining the validity of 
omnibus state enforcement schemes such as Arizona’s SB 1070. In these 
cases, the execution of the laws—and not the statutory backdrop—played 
the central role, harkening back to Chy Lung’s articulation that the federal 
government is responsible for both the “character” of immigration law 
and the “manner of its execution.”319 The legal theory animating these 
                                                                                                                     
 318. See Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, Reappraisal, supra note 43, at 2126–27. 
 319. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); see also supra Section I.A. 
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cases underscores the unique role of the Executive Branch and the 
inadequacy of the current doctrinal framework to capture the nature of 
immigration federalism.  
In Arizona, the Court invalidated three of four provisions of the state’s 
immigration enforcement law.320 The critical distinction between the 
majority and the partial dissents—the opinions concurring in part and 
dissenting in part that would have upheld other challenged provisions of 
the law321—was their respective understanding of the President’s role in 
setting federal immigration policy. Most notably, Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s partial dissent focused on congressional exclusivity in defining 
the parameters of federal immigration policy. His reasoning, which 
mirrored the arguments advanced by the State in its written submissions, 
argued that federal law defined a broad class of persons as potentially 
removable.322 State efforts to investigate, discover, and even prosecute 
individuals who fell within that group were entirely consistent with, if not 
beneficial to, congressional prerogatives.323 Neither resource constraints 
nor the policy priorities of the President, according to Justice Scalia, were 
sufficient to preempt state law as long as state law did not directly conflict 
with federal statutes as written by Congress.324  
The majority, however, seemed to rely upon the importance of 
executive decision-making as constitutive of federal policy. Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, framed the discussion of the 
specific provisions of Arizona law by noting that discretionary executive 
decisions are “principal” features of the enforcement system.325 On this 
                                                                                                                     
 320. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). 
 321. Id. at 2515–22 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 322. See id. at 2515–17. 
 323. Dismissing the role of executive discretion as a constituent part of federal immigration 
policy for preemption purposes, Justice Scalia argued: 
Of course there is no reason why the Federal Executive’s need to allocate its 
scarce enforcement resources should disable Arizona from devoting its resources 
to illegal immigration in Arizona that in its view the Federal Executive has given 
short shrift. . . . But there has come to pass, and is with us today, the specter that 
Arizona . . . predicted: A Federal Government that does not want to enforce the 
immigration laws as written, and leaves the States’ borders unprotected . . . . So 
the issue is a stark one. Are the sovereign States at the mercy of the Federal 
Executive’s refusal to enforce the Nation’s immigration laws?  
Id. at 2520–21. 
 324. Id. at 2516–17, 2521. 
 325. As Justice Kennedy noted: 
A principal feature of the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by 
immigration officials. Federal officials, as an initial matter, must decide whether 
it makes sense to pursue removal at all. . . . The dynamic nature of relations with 
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view, the problem with state enforcement statutes is not that they interfere 
with federal statutes as written; instead, they tend to subvert or disrupt 
the President’s enforcement priorities based on the Administration’s 
discretionary use of enforcement resources and normative decisions 
regarding the appropriateness of immigration prosecution against any 
particular individual or group of individuals.326 The significance of 
Arizona is not its reification of the primacy of the federal government in 
immigration enforcement but rather the distinctive consolidation of 
immigration authority in the President as distinct from Congress.327  
This reliance on nonbinding agency priorities and executive 
prerogatives also highlights the inadequacy of the current doctrinal 
framework for analyzing immigration federalism conflicts.328 In 
traditional preemption analysis, the Court has long maintained that the 
intent of Congress is the touchstone of any preemption decision, and 
traditionally only Congress has the authority to preempt state laws.329 As 
Professor Catherine Kim argues, the Arizona Court purported to apply 
ordinary preemption analysis, although it was clearly relying on the 
Executive’s interpretation and reading of the legislative backdrop—an 
interpretation arguably at odds with congressional intent.330 She 
maintains that this friction between restrictionist state and local 
legislation, on the one hand, and presidential decisions to calibrate or 
focus enforcement, on the other, is uniquely poignant in the immigration 
preemption arena.331 Professor Cox sharpened the point by noting that 
                                                                                                                     
other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies 
are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy . . . . 
Id. at 2499 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
 326. See Cox, supra note 25, at 57–58 (describing this gap “as a gap between formal 
deportability and normative deportability”). 
 327. Id. at 61; Eric Posner, The Imperial President of Arizona, SLATE (June 26, 2012, 
12:04 PM), http: / /www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/06/the_sup 
reme_court_s_arizona_immigration_ruling_and_the_imperial_presidency_.html (“In fact, the 
ruling matters more for what it says about the advance of executive power in the United 
States . . . .”). 
 328. See MOTOMURA, supra note 35, at 5 (defending the idea that executive agency action, 
including enforcement laxity, should be understood as constituting immigration policy); Cox, 
supra note 25, at 55–56 (arguing that the Court’s view about the preemptive power of presidential 
action in Arizona is defensible because the structure of immigration law is different from other 
areas); Kim, supra note 25, at 719–20.  
 329. E.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Kim, supra note 25, at 696–98 (noting that “the Supreme Court 
continues to maintain that congressional intent remains the ‘touchstone’ of any preemption 
analysis”). 
 330. See Kim, supra note 25, at 705–09. Note that one could also argue that Congress 
intended the President to exercise large-scale discretionary enforcement decisions. 
 331. See id. at 708–09, 720–21. 
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outside of immigration law, enforcement redundancy between federal 
and state legislators and officials is a constitutional and well-accepted 
course of interaction.332 Yet, this redundancy was the critical legal defect 
in the various state immigration enforcement laws. Both scholars note 
that in the immigration field, significant legislative delegation of 
enforcement authority to the Executive Branch and ever-present foreign 
affairs concerns have muddied the doctrinal background.333 Arizona, by 
squeezing these presidential immigration federalism concerns into the 
traditional preemption framework without explaining the unique features 
of executive action vis-à-vis state-level policies in immigration law, has 
introduced potential incoherence into the doctrine. 334  
A second, subtler evolution in preemption analysis arises from 
executive actions that co-opt state and local agencies. As state and local 
involvement become increasingly mediated by federal authorities, the 
Executive consolidates federal power, even as states and localities appear 
to be taking on a greater role. With programs such as S-Comm, PEP, and 
287(g), federal executive-mediated and managed involvement remains 
the only way for states and localities to participate in immigration 
enforcement. This form of interaction between the federal and subfederal 
governments in immigration is not based on the independent authority of 
states but on interconnectedness dictated by the federal government. As 
Professor Abbe Gluck describes, in certain regulatory areas, Congress 
either builds in a concurrent state administration or includes 
implementation in the federal statutory scheme, a scheme she describes 
as “intrastatutory federalism.”335 She notes that this form of federalism 
occurs within federal laws in areas such as health care, environmental 
                                                                                                                     
 332. See Cox, supra note 25, at 41–43 (noting that overlapping enforcement schemes are 
commonplace in other regulatory areas). 
 333. Id. at 64; Kim, supra note 25, at 709–10. 
 334. Other scholars have critiqued the Court’s imbuing of executive priority setting with 
preemptive power. See generally Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 
CONST. COMMENT. 339, 360–61 (2010) (explaining why congressional decision-making about 
preemption is preferable to presidential preemption but noting the reality that agencies, and hence 
the President, substantially influence preemption decisions); Roderick M. Hills Jr., Arizona v. 
United States: The Unitary Executive’s Enforcement Discretion as a Limit on Federalism, 2012 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 189, 191 (“[P]residential power to use prosecutorial discretion to bar state 
enforcement of federal law ought to be narrowly construed.”); Rubenstein, supra note 26, at 87 
(arguing that presidential directives cannot simultaneously be law for preemption purposes but 
not for separation of powers concerns). 
 335. Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the 
Old-Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1754 (2013); Abbe R. Gluck, 
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of the Federal Law 
in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 542–44 (2011) [hereinafter Gluck, 
Intrastatutory Federalism]. 
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law, and telecommunications regulation.336 
In immigration law, the INA provides leeway for states to participate 
in limited forms of immigration enforcement and delegates to the 
Executive Branch the authority and discretion to enter into agreements 
with state agencies for expanding local immigration enforcement through 
287(g) agreements.337 Outside the scope of the INA, DHS’s S-Comm 
program conscripted states and localities into aiding federal authorities to 
identify potentially deportable persons.338 PEP, S-Comm’s replacement, 
functions similarly.339 In these arrangements, states and localities may 
enforce federal immigration laws and provide information to the federal 
immigration authorities, but they must do so primarily within the 
boundaries calibrated by executive branch officials. 
This type of federalism arrangement is paradoxical because it 
consolidates and nationalizes immigration enforcement power, even as it 
ostensibly vindicates federalism values and appears to apparently respect 
the independent status of states.340 In short, programs such as 287(g) and 
S-Comm give the Executive a stronger claim to field preemption in any 
lawsuits challenging ultra vires state and local enforcement activity. On 
that score, the DOJ’s brief for the United States in Arizona mentioned S-
Comm as part of the federal government’s comprehensive immigration 
framework that already incorporated state and local participation.341 In 
these instances, states and localities, desirous of a greater role in 
immigration enforcement, have paradoxically further embedded 
executive primacy and lent more credence to the claim that subfederal 
immigration participation can solely be engaged on the federal 
government’s terms.342 Thus, the same tools that the Executive uses to 
permit state and local involvement in immigration enforcement become 
part of the legal basis for shutting down any independent exercises of 
subfederal authority that the federal government does not oversee. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 336. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 335, at 613–14. 
 337. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (2012) (permitting state involvement with illegal reentry 
proceedings); id. § 1324(c) (permitting states to arrest persons smuggling illegal aliens into the 
United States); id. § 1357(g) (providing for agreements with local law enforcement agencies). 
 338. Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 
667 (2014). 
 339. David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just for Restrictionists: Building a Stable 
and Efficient Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J.L. & POL. 411, 453 (2015). 
 340. See Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 335, at 565. 
 341. Brief for the United States, supra note 201, at 2–8. 
 342. Cf. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism, supra note 335, at 572 (arguing that incorporating 
states into the design of federal statutes helps the federal government “field claim” the area). 
62
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/3
2016] THE PRESIDENT AND IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 163 
 
To be sure, these interdependent arrangements also provide 
opportunities for states to practice “uncooperative federalism.”343 States 
and localities have resisted these forms of co-optation into the 
Administration’s enforcement scheme; Section III.B explores these 
possibilities more fully. But, it is important to note that the overwhelming 
majority of jurisdictions in the United States have not entered into 287(g) 
agreements, and the number of such arrangements is dwindling.344 States 
and localities’ resistance to S-Comm ultimately led to its demise and 
rebirth in an apparently less robust form.345 But as a general matter, the 
Executive in recent years has used these programs to simultaneously 
conscript states and localities into remedying informational and capacity 
deficits for the federal government while limiting their participation to 
only that approved by the Executive Branch. 
Looking forward, the incidence of the federal executive presence in 
immigration suits—as litigating party, originator of agency policy, and 
co-opter of state and local agencies—is more likely. The nearly 
unprecedented decision for the DOJ to sue Arizona and other 
restrictionist states, and the success of those interventions, would seem to 
incentivize the Executive Branch to continue to deploy this form of 
executive intervention and wield its litigatory power against state-level 
trends that it opposes in the future. When those suits arrive in federal 
courts, the analysis this Article presents can help guide them in their 
attempt to grasp the unique features of executive action in immigration 
federalism and supplement the theoretical defenses constructed by 
Professors Cox and Kim.346 Whatever its precise contours, judicial 
clarification of the distinct—even oppositional—role of the President in 
immigration federalism matters appears necessary, especially given the 
likelihood that federal immigration action in the near future is likely to 
spring from the President and not from Congress.347  
                                                                                                                     
 343. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (discussing how “uncooperative federalism” might affect preemption 
analysis). 
 344. See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, http:www.ice.gov/news/library/
factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2016) (listing the small number of law enforcement 
agencies that have 287(g) agreements). 
 345. See supra text accompanying notes 245–48. 
 346. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 347. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Response, In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action, and 
the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. 59, 62–64 (2013) (arguing that the Obama Administration’s 
handling of the DACA program was in line with the Take Care Clause); Memorandum from Karl 
R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel to the 
President, The Dep’t of Homeland Sec’y Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens 
Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others (Nov. 19, 2014) (advising 
President Obama on the legality of proposed programs). But see Roberty J. Delahunty & John C. 
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B.  States as Checks on Executive Power 
Beyond subtly accreting executive power for preemption purposes, 
the Executive’s co-optation of state and local resources and its catalyzing 
of certain forms of state resistance to federal action can provide 
opportunities for state contestation of executive policy.348 Here, this 
Article returns to the concern that motivated it: the contention that 
analyzing recent presidential action on immigration only by asking 
whether the President usurped Congress’s role is too narrow a 
perspective. Accounting for state and local responses to certain executive 
actions reveals the possibilities of a federalist check on executive power, 
explored below, as well as the potential for federalist action to deepen 
and entrench presidential authority, explored in Section III.C that follows.  
Traditional separation of powers analysis concerns itself with the 
checks and balances that the branches of the federal government use to 
limit each other’s power. More nuanced theories attempt to consider the 
role of administrative agencies in this mutually disciplining structure.349 
Only recently, however, have theorists considered how political 
partisanship—in particular, partisanship mediated through state and local 
jurisdictions—might also play a role in this system of governmental 
checks and balances, thereby meshing federalism and separation of 
powers analyses.350 Federalism, like the system of checks and balances, 
was at least in part conceived for the purpose of preventing too much 
power accretion in the federal government.  
But in the specific dynamic identified here, the state-level actors 
sometimes specifically serve the purpose of casting doubt on the legality 
or legitimacy of presidential action specifically.351 When states are able 
                                                                                                                     
Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the 
DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 790, 853 (2013). 
 348. Professor Rubenstein approaches this connection as a “paradox.” David S. Rubenstein, 
The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 267, 268 (2015). 
 349. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 574–75 (1984) (explaining the complex 
relationship between separation of powers and administrative agencies). 
 350. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2321 (2006) (reexamining separation of powers concerns through the 
lens of political party competition); Bulman-Pozen, Afterlife of American Federalism, supra note 
21, at 1922; Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard, supra note 38, at 500; Rubenstein, supra 
note 348, at 323–24. See generally Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, Importance of the Political, 
supra note 43 (offering a politicized account of state and local policy proliferation on 
immigration). 
 351. In a forthcoming paper, Professor Ming Hsu Chen frames a core concern with 
presidential action as a perception of its “legitimacy” and argues that state responses play a large 
role in constituting that legitimacy. Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: Understanding the 
Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) 
(draft on file with author). 
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to enact legislation, engage in civil disobedience, or otherwise utilize 
federal dependence on state institutions to express disapproval with 
federal policies, they serve the role of checking federal power and, in 
immigration federalism in particular, cautioning the President.352 Thus, 
asking whether DACA or DAPA, for example, exceeds the constitutional 
limits on executive authority by only looking at the relationship between 
the President and Congress is too narrow a focus. States and localities 
may also serve a checking function,353 which may be a sufficient 
safeguard in a functionalist analysis.  
The idea of state and local action that serves to provide context and 
motivation for constitutionally appropriate or responsive presidential 
action is manifest in the examples already explored in this Article. The 
Executive’s desire to encourage Chinese labor migration in the mid- to 
late 1800s prompted sustained oppositional reaction from California and 
other western states, which became especially significant when the 
President vetoed Congress’s initial attempt to undo the Burlingame 
Treaty.354 Eventually, however, a new treaty was negotiated, and when 
that did not go far enough, the President finally yielded to the sustained 
state-level opposition to Chinese migration with the signing of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act.355  
Similarly, the then-burgeoning state-level trend on enforcement laws 
from 2004 through 2011 was, if political rhetoric and legal briefs are any 
indication, a reaction to the manner in which the Executive Branch was 
“under-enforcing” immigration law. In turn, that trend led to DHS’s 
creation of S-Comm as one way of placating those state and local 
impulses. Also, to turn the wheel one more time, the state and local 
resistance to S-Comm led to a modification of the program.356 This could 
be added to the list of the responses to the administrative decision 
regarding where to house the surge of unaccompanied child migrants 
                                                                                                                     
 352. See Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard, supra note 38, at 486 (explaining how 
states serve as a check against executive power). 
 353. See id. 
 354. Joan Fitzpatrick & William McKay Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The Influence of 
International Law on the Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH. L. REV. 589, 589–
90 (1995); see also supra Subsection I.B.1. 
 355. See Abrams, supra note 93, at 709–10. 
 356. These states did not challenge the forced information-sharing aspect of S-Comm; 
instead, they challenged the detainer aspect of it, arguing that they need not comply with any 
federal requests to detain individuals awaiting transfer to federal custody. Such a command, these 
jurisdictions argued, would amount to unconstitutional commandeering of state executive and 
enforcement structures by federal authorities. See Christine N. Cimini, Hands off Our 
Fingerprints: State, Local, and Individual Defiance of Federal Immigration Enforcement, 47 
CONN. L. REV. 101, 131–34 (2014); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) 
(striking down provisions of the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that 
“commandeered” local enforcement officials). 
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from Central America, as public officials in some localities voiced their 
displeasure with accommodating them.357 States have attempted to deny 
driver’s licenses to DACA recipients,358 and a coalition of states have 
filed suit against the President’s latest grant of deferred action.359  
In all of these circumstances, states and localities have taken up the 
mantle of resistance to presidential action typically expected from 
Congress, arguing that they are faithful agents of popular will against a 
President who flouts immigration law and public sentiment. In other 
words, as Professor Bulman-Pozen would perhaps argue, these states’ 
resistance to the discretionary executive decisions utilizes the tropes of 
federalism to vindicate separation of powers concerns.360 In many 
instances, such checks will take on a partisan flavor, as “red” states and 
localities are more likely to challenge a “blue” President, and vice 
versa.361 In this way, states can act as a type of check on federal executive 
authority when Congress is unwilling or unable to do the same.362 The 
flexibility of executive prioritization and agency guidance, in return, 
allows for responsiveness to state-level resistance (if the Executive 
desires) in ways that Congress would be incapable of achieving. 
This form of checks and balances in the guise of executive–state 
federalism can be one of the limited ways to challenge presidential action 
in the immigration field. The past three years have witnessed two 
significant exercises of presidential authority with both DACA and 
DAPA. In that time, Congress has not responded with any legislation, 
although it has attempted to do so. While some members of Congress—
mostly, if not exclusively, Republicans—have decried the President’s 
actions as a slap in the face, a dereliction of his constitutional duty, and 
an encroachment on legislative authority,363 they have no viable way of 
                                                                                                                     
 357. See, e.g., Halimah Abdullah, Not in My Backyard: Communities Protest Surge of 
Immigrant Kids, CNN (July 16, 2014, 9:46 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/15/politics/
immigration-not-in-my-backyard/; Associated Press, Immigration Protest: Murrieta Latest 
Flashpoint in Debate, FOX NEWS (July 4, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/07/04/
immigration-protest-murrieta-latest-flashpoint-in-debate/. 
 358. See, e.g., Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1057–58, 1069 (9th Cir. 
2014) (granting a preliminary injunction against an Arizona policy that prohibited DACA 
beneficiaries from obtaining driver’s licenses by using EADs received as part of the program as 
proof of lawful presence), stay denied, 135 S. Ct. 889 (2014). 
 359. Inside Story Team, Can Congress and States Stop the President’s Immigration Action?, 
AL JAZEERA ENG. (Dec. 5, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/inside-story/articles/ 
2014/12/5/what-tools-do-congressandstateshavetostopthepresident.html (discussing a joint 
lawsuit by many states against the Executive’s deferred action). 
 360. See Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 21, at 1098, 1100, 1125. 
 361. See Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as Safeguard, supra note 38, at 470, 489. 
 362. Bulman-Pozen, Afterlife of American Federalism, supra note 21, at 1940–46. 
 363. See Daniel Newhauser, House Rebukes Obama for Immigration Executive Action, 
NAT’L J. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/2014/12/04/House-Rebukes-
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challenging the action during Obama’s Presidency. Passing any 
legislation is difficult because congressional Democrats support the 
President’s actions or are not interested in opposing him; moreover, the 
President would likely veto any legislation that undermines his orders.364 
Various problems with legal standing would likely prevent judicial 
challenges by individual federal legislators. In the end, Congress’s ability 
to contest the President’s actions would seem to be limited to funding 
measures that affect the President’s programs (assuming again that the 
President does not veto them), non-operative resolutions,365 and the use 
of media and other platforms to argue the policy merits of the President’s 
actions. Perhaps such attacks could weaken the President and his party, 
thereby facilitating the election of a Republican president who would 
have the power to undo President Obama’s directives.  
Republican congressional members might also look to friendly state 
legislatures or governors and seek ways to resist presidential action by 
tightening state policies with regard to immigrants.366 At the very least, 
state and local enactments or pronouncements can function as 
expressively significant lawmaking in opposition to the Executive’s 
desired policy vision. Indeed, several states and members of state 
executive departments, led by the state of Texas, prevailed at the district 
court level in a lawsuit challenging the President’s DAPA policy.367 The 
appellate court affirmed the district court’s injunction,368 and even though 
the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari,369 the suing states have 
                                                                                                                     
Obama-Immigration-Executive-Action. 
 364. Justin Sink, President Threatens Immigration Veto, HILL (Nov. 20, 2014, 6:00 PM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/224933-obama-threatens-gop-with-veto. 
 365. In the wake of the President’s announcement, the House voted 219–197 
(overwhelmingly along party lines) to pass a resolution to not implement the presidential action 
on immigration. Newhauser, supra note 363. 
 366. As examples, states could institute employer verification laws; deny undocumented 
immigrants access to public institutions of higher education; potentially deny all undocumented 
persons, including all recipients of deferred action, driver’s licenses; implement stricter 
identification and verification requirements for state or local public benefits; institute state 
policies that preempt the ability of local jurisdictions to serve as sanctuary jurisdictions; and enact 
state policies that deny funding to localities that provide public assistance to undocumented 
persons. 
 367. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 603, 667–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015), stay denied, 
787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015); David Montgomery & Julia Preston, 17 States Suing on 
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/us/executive-
action-on-immigration-prompts-texas-to-sue.html. As other states, governors, and attorneys 
general have joined the suit, the number of plaintiffs has risen to twenty-six. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 
3d at 603. But, it is worth noting that some governors and attorneys general are suing in their own 
capacity, and thus it would be inaccurate to state that twenty-six states have sued. 
 368. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. United 
States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). 
 369. Amy Howe, Court Will Review Obama Administration’s Immigration Policy: In Plain 
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successfully stalled DAPA for most, if not all, of the remainder of the 
Obama Presidency.370 In addition, it presents a legal argument against 
executive action—similar to arguments voiced by Republican members 
of Congress—in a federal court and requires the DOJ to legally defend 
the President’s actions.371 If the state lawsuit eventually succeeds, they 
will have dismantled some of the signature immigration achievements of 
the Obama Presidency without Congress enacting a single piece of 
legislation. 
Finally, while the most recent example of state resistance to executive 
discretion on immigration has taken a partisan hue, resistance to 
presidential action will not necessarily emanate solely from the opposing 
party. Thus, for example, states and localities that pushed back on S-
Comm were entirely in Democratic-heavy jurisdictions.372 In these 
instances, partisanship would have had nothing to do with the question of 
whether mandatory detainers or attempts to resist them were 
constitutional. However, the ability of states and localities to influence 
executive discretion may indeed be easier when those lobbying efforts373 
are conducted within the same party rather than across party lines. Thus, 
on the question of where state and local resistance to expanded executive 
authority are likely to be successful, the answer depends on whether the 
strategy is a constitutional one, to be resolved through courts, or an 
administrative one, to be resolved through efforts of persuasion, 
information-sharing, and direct lobbying of the Executive.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 19, 2016, 4:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/court-
will-review-obama-administrations-immigration-policy-in-plain-english/. Importantly, the 
Court’s order granting certiorari asked the parties to brief the constitutional issue whether DAPA 
violates the President’s duty to “faithfully execute” the law under Art. II of the Constitution. 
Texas, 136 S. Ct. at 906. 
 370. See Josh Gerstein & Adam B. Lerner, Ruling Puts Obama’s Immigration Legacy in 
Jeopardy, POLITICO (May 26, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/barack-obama-
executive-action-immigration-setback-appeals-court-118290 (commenting that a ruling on the 
Texas case will likely not come until June 2016). 
 371. See Texas, 86 F. Supp. at 613–14. 
 372. Preston, supra note 239 (describing primarily Democratic states’ resistance to S-
Comm). 
 373. Because the Executive relies on state and local authorities to remedy its informational 
and investigatory deficiencies, these jurisdictions can leverage and influence enforcement 
decisions. These situations in which states utilize their status as federal agents or “servants” to 
contest federal policy can, as Professors Heather Gerken and Bulman-Pozen argue, provide 
powerful platforms for state contestation of national policy. See Gerken & Bulman-Pozen, supra 
note 343, at 1274–80 (providing examples). 
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C.  States as Potentially Fertile Ground for Expanding Presidential 
Power 
While states may find limited ways to successfully resist presidential 
action on immigration, the more powerful trend appears to be the way in 
which the President can use states to help entrench his policy vision on 
immigration, thereby gaining a stronger position vis-à-vis Congress. 
Relatedly, these state and local policies can constrain the policy choices 
politically available to a future group of federal legislators.  
This was certainly true in the case of DACA, as actions by the 
Executive prompted most states to reexamine and modify their policies 
on driver’s licenses, the overwhelming majority of which previously 
required proof of legal presence in the United States.374 Moreover, 
beyond licenses, other important state and local areas for immigrant 
integration, such as local identification cards, state tuition policies, public 
welfare provision, and even health care, have all witnessed accelerated 
momentum after DACA.375  
This Article does not claim that the Obama Administration intended 
these state-level policy changes when it implemented DACA. Indeed, 
there is no mention of state driver’s licenses in any of the federal 
government’s documents outlining the contours of DACA or its effects 
on potential beneficiaries or state and local jurisdictions.376 At the same 
time, the administrative creation of a large class of persons who now are 
temporarily lawfully present despite their unlawful status virtually 
                                                                                                                     
 374. See, e.g., Daniel C. Vock, States Begin Giving Driver’s Licenses to Young Immigrants, 
GOVERNING: STATELINE (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.governing.com/news/state/sl-states-begin-
giving-drivers-licenses-to-young-immigrants.html (describing states’ actions to change driver’s 
license policies in response to DACA). Absent such modification, DACA recipients in these states 
might not have been able to obtain a driver’s license to get to work, and they might very well have 
sued to gain that privilege. Indeed, such a lawsuit was filed against the state of Arizona which, 
along with Nebraska, tried to resist extending driving privileges to DACA recipients. Ariz. Dream 
Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014) (ordering remand to the lower court 
with instructions to grant a preliminary injunction against the Arizona law that did not allow 
Plaintiff’s DACA documents as proof of federal authorization to be present in the United States), 
stay denied, 135 S. Ct. 889 (2014). That Arizona lost in federal court attests to the ways in which 
certain types of presidential action can, if well crafted, limit room for maneuvering among states 
contemplating resisting or thwarting the successful implementation of those actions. 
 375. Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, Understanding Immigration Federalism, supra note 13 
(documenting an integrationist state trend since 2012 and listing jurisdictions with these types of 
laws); S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Allan Colbern, The California Package: Immigrant 
Integration and the Evolving Nature of State Citizenship, U.C. RIVERSIDE POL’Y MATTERS J., 
Spring 2015, at 1, 2–3, 5. 
 376. See John Goodwin, Legally Present, but Not Yet Legal: The State Attorney General’s 
Role in Securing Public Benefits for Childhood Arrivals, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 340, 359–
60 (2014). 
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necessitated some state-level response.377 With a group of a few hundred 
thousand DACA recipients openly attending schools and seeking 
employment, and needing transportation to take advantage of both,378 
DACA helped ease the policy climate for states desirous of accounting 
for all residents, regardless of immigration status.  
This process—an exogenous shock (this one prompted by the 
President’s decision on DACA) provoking a rash of changes in state 
policies on driver’s licenses—comports very closely with what 
Professors Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones have called a 
“punctuated equilibrium,” in which an exogenous development upends a 
status quo of policy inertia, which subsequently catalyzes processes that 
propel toward rapid change.379 The President’s action on DACA is 
exogenous because the Administration was not seeking to change state 
policy on driver’s licenses when it announced its policy in June 2012.380 
Additionally, the policy reverberations from the 2012 executive action 
continue. As DACA recipients renew their status and continue to 
establish deep ties to their communities through education, work, and 
family ties, they appear more and more as a permanently non-deportable 
group. Thus, by regularizing, without legalizing, hundreds of thousands 
of previously unauthorized immigrants, the President’s action catalyzed 
states and localities into dealing with the everyday needs of these 
residents and their families. 
Thinking more broadly from the perspective of presidential power in 
a federalism framework, states and localities provide potentially fertile 
grounds for the Executive Branch to entrench its policy vision, especially 
in jurisdictions led by officials of the same party as the President.381 
Unlike Congress, state legislatures cannot provide lawful status to 
                                                                                                                     
 377. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Driver’s Licenses for 
Undocumented Immigrants: How the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action Policy Paved the 
Way, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 14, 2013, 9:32 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/
opinion/ci_24283776/. 
 378. See Zenen Jaimes Pérez, How DACA Has Improved the Lives of Undocumented Young 
People, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/immigration/report/2014/11/19/101868/how-daca-has-improved-the-lives-of-undocumen 
ted-young-people/. 
 379. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 1, 9–10 (1993). 
 380. Even though the Administration did not openly admit it, the conventional wisdom of 
the President’s action on DACA was that it was a politically calculated move intended to appeal 
to Latino voters in advance of the 2012 presidential election, especially in light of prominent and 
sustained protests by pro-immigrant advocates. See Miriam Jordan, Anatomy of a Deferred-Action 
Dream, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14, 2012, 8:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239 
6390443982904578046951916986168 (“The policy has strengthened Mr. Obama’s standing 
among Hispanic voters.”). 
 381. See Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 21, 1125–26. 
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recipients of deferred action. However, their ability to legislate 
complementary policies on issues such as driver’s licenses, in-state 
tuition, public assistance, and professional licensing help enable and 
entrench the President’s policy. It is enabling because without this type 
of state action, recipients of deferred action and EADs would still find it 
difficult to attend schools or transport themselves to work.382 Much like 
the state migratory commissions created in the wake of the Bracero 
Program, states and localities function as important places where 
welcoming policies can—and in some instances, can only—be 
instantiated.383 And, similar to past instances, presidential predilections 
toward immigrants are likely to be more generous and expansive than 
congressional attitudes.384 
Further, state and local action is entrenching because as these policies 
become a part of the public policy of several states, future congressional 
measures on immigration will have to address and likely accommodate 
them. DACA and DAPA, as temporary forms of administrative relief 
from prosecution, apply only to a selected class385 and will not last 
beyond the renewal periods granted at the whim of subsequent 
presidential administrations. In contrast, state laws passed in the wake of 
DACA inure to a class of undocumented beneficiaries beyond the groups 
identified by the executive order. Further, they are state legislative 
enactments that will last until they are democratically rescinded at the 
state level or expressly preempted by federal legislation, even if a future 
administration rescinds DACA and DAPA. Therefore, they are highly 
likely to remain a part of state statutory schemes well beyond DACA and 
DAPA’s time horizon, providing more “permanent” forms of legal 
protection and benefit. Importantly, these state laws also imbue 
enforcement relief with additional democratic legitimacy, since that relief 
                                                                                                                     
 382. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Ian Lovett & Vindu Goel, Turmoil over Immigration 
Status? California Has Lived It for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/us/turmoil-over-immigration-status-california-has-lived-it-
for-decades.html; Christian M. Wade, Questions Arise over Obama Decree, NEWBURYPORT NEWS 
(Dec. 6, 2014, 3:45 AM), http://www.newburyportnews.com/news/local_news/questions-arise-
over-obama-decree/article_96b72bf7-ba83-57cd-b04b-96e597eaebe8.html (detailing 
Massachusetts’s efforts to determine how to accommodate beneficiaries of the President’s 
executive action). 
 383. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 641 (2008) (arguing that localities are normatively desirable places for 
integrative subfederal action toward immigrants). 
 384. Cox, supra note 25, at 33, 63 (noting several examples of presidents taking expansionist 
and welcoming stances). 
 385. See Alicia Triche, Caesar or Chavez? President Obama’s Polarizing Executive Action 
on Immigration, 62 FED. LAW. 10, 10 (2015) (noting that DAPA grants “temporary deferral of 
removal and employment authorization to certain parents of U.S. citizens (and permanent 
residents) who have continuously resided in the country since Jan. 1, 2010”). 
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has the backing of several state legislative bodies even if it does not have 
the backing of Congress.  
This dynamic of state and local officials seeking to provide more 
popular backing to executive action has also been evident in recent 
actions by large-city mayors. In the wake of the President’s second large-
scale deferred action program, more than twenty mayors (mostly, if not 
exclusively, from the Democratic Party) formed the Cities United for 
Immigration Action collective386 and met in New York City to discuss 
the implementation of inclusive, immigrant-friendly policies consistent 
with the President’s actions.387 Not only do these mayors represent a 
“coalition of the willing” in support of executive action, consisting of 
forty-eight jurisdictions and more than 25 million residents,388 they also 
mark the building of a policy network that has the potential to outlast the 
Obama Presidency. As Professor Judith Resnick notes, these types of 
translocal governmental organizations can cross territorial lines to help 
shape and spread policies.389 In this way—and often with the help of 
policy entrepreneurs—federalism takes on a horizontal dimension,390 in 
addition to its vertical component and its separation of powers 
possibilities. This horizontal dimension from state to state and city to city 
can, and likely will, create feedback loops and inform the scope and 
substance of any future federal legislation.391 Congress will be 
constrained to either accommodating these integrationist impulses at the 
state and local levels or attempting to override them at the cost of 
disregarding the political will of several dispersed jurisdictions.392 
                                                                                                                     
 386. Our Leaders, CITIES UNITED FOR IMMIGRATION ACTION, 
http://www.citiesforaction.us/our_leaders (last visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
 387. Roque Planas, Democratic Mayors Rally Support for Obama’s Immigration Changes, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2014, 12:43 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/08/
mayors-immigration-reform_n_6288446.html. 
 388. See Our Leaders, supra note 386. 
 389. See Judith Resnik, Federalism(s)’ Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-
essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, and Temporizing Accomodations, in FEDERALISM AND 
SUBSIDIARITY 363, 401–04 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014). 
 390. Id. at 403; see also Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, Reappraisal, supra note 43, 2108–
12 (discussing the influence of restrictionist issue entrepreneurs in being able to spread 
enforcement-heavy policies across multiple jurisdictions). 
 391. Rodríguez, supra note 187, at 2128–29 (“[L]awmaking power at the state and local level 
can translate into influence at the national level, thus giving both minorities and dispersed 
majorities greater purchase on public debate and policy.”). 
 392. This cooperation between large-city mayors and the President stands in sharp contrast 
to the reactions of large cities to the unequal and increased enforcement efforts by the Reagan 
Administration. Those efforts prompted sanctuary laws in several jurisdictions in the early to mid-
1980s aimed at protecting several particular groups from removal. See Gzesh, supra note 166. 
Federal laws passed after those enactments ended up providing pathways to regularizing the status 
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To extend the metaphor of the President seeking to entrench his policy 
vision, complementary state policies on immigration can help deepen the 
roots of executive action on immigration, making it far more difficult for 
Congress to eradicate or significantly alter such policies with subsequent 
legislation. Surely, this kind of “rooting” can also happen through other 
means, such as the mobilization of public opinion among policy 
beneficiaries393 and supportive actions by nonprofits.394 However, state 
complementary action can be stronger and more enduring than popular 
mobilization because the former is institutionalized through state 
legislation and policy implementation, while the latter must rely on 
private actors overcoming problems of collective action among potential 
beneficiaries. Also, state complementary action on presidential action is 
likely stronger than supportive actions by nonprofits, which do not have 
the same benefits of democratic legitimacy and accountability, the ability 
to raise revenues in a diffuse and predictable manner, the coercive force 
of law, or the ability to operate throughout a state rather than only in areas 
where immigrants are numerous. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s exploration of the President’s role in immigration 
federalism allows for a systemic understanding of the myriad ways in 
which executive action affects state-level policy. The Executive in our 
current political system can exercise several points of leverage on 
subfederal immigration activity, including curtailing such policy through 
litigation, co-opting it through integrated enforcement schemes, and 
seeking to catalyze it through executive authority that creates 
unavoidable state-level concerns. This last set of federalism dynamics 
holds interesting possibilities, especially as Congress remains deadlocked 
on immigration reform for the foreseeable future. While complementary 
action by states and localities provides many potential opportunities for 
the President to implement his policy vision, partisan dynamics and 
constitutional considerations nevertheless limit these opportunities. 
Importantly, however, these constraints also apply to state and local 
jurisdictions that seek to resist executive action on immigration. Indeed, 
the more powerful trend appears to be the ways in which the President 
can use states to entrench his policies and gain leverage vis-à-vis 
                                                                                                                     
of those groups who were the subject of such enforcement, as well as other undocumented 
immigrants who fell outside those specific populations. See id. 
 393. See, e.g., ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR 
POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 74–78 (2003). 
 394. E.g., TOM K. WONG ET AL., UNDOCUMENTED NO MORE: A NATIONWIDE ANALYSIS OF 
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS, OR DACA, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2013), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/report/2013/09/20/74599/undocumented-
no-more/. 
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Congress. 
As a new round of executive policies on deferred action and modified 
enforcement policies goes into effect, it remains unclear what states and 
localities will do. Oppositional states should continue pursuing avenues 
to mitigate aspects of administrative relief, and sympathetic jurisdictions 
should continue the push to entrench and regularize the President’s 
policy. Either way, the legal and political story here suggests that states 
and localities are not incidental players in what most conceive of as 
primarily a separation of powers battle between the President and 
Congress. Indeed, states and localities are important players in their own 
right—as responsive or resistive policy makers in federalism 
frameworks, critical mediators in power struggles between the President 
and Congress, or as political partisans—in immigration policy. 
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Table 1.  Typology of Executive Actions and Their Federalism 
Outcomes 
 
 Year(s) Institutional 
Action 
Primary 
Type of 
Federalism 
Effect 
Outcomes  
(Intended or Unintended) 
Burlingame 
Treaty395 1868 Treaty Catalyzing 
Intention to override state 
restriction, instead provokes 
further state legislative 
action 
Bracero Program 
(absent 
congressional 
authorization)396 
1942, 
1948–
1951 
Bilateral 
agreement Catalyzing 
State legislation and state 
and local programs 
promoting integration 
services; direct lobbying of 
administration officials by 
states 
Haitian and 
Central American 
migrant arrivals397 
1980–
1986 
Change in 
federal 
enforcement 
priorities 
Catalyzing 
State and local sanctuary 
ordinances in opposition to 
federal enforcement actions 
Secure 
Communities (S-
Comm)398 
2008–
2014 
Federal 
agency 
prerogative 
Co-opting 
Intention to make attempts at 
state immigration 
enforcement redundant and 
to bolster chances for 
immigration reform 
legislation in Congress 
Arizona v. United 
States399 
2010–
2012 
Party to 
lawsuit Curtailing 
Limits on state immigration 
enforcement authority  
In re Garcia400 2012 Amicus brief Catalyzing 
State passage of affirmative 
legislative action as 
mentioned in amicus brief 
Deferred Action 
for Childhood 
Arrivals 
(DACA)401 
2012–
Present 
Change in 
enforcement 
priorities 
Catalyzing Prompts changes in state policies on driver’s licenses 
                                                                                                                     
 395. See supra Subsection I.B.1. 
 396. See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
 397. See supra Subsection I.B.3. 
 398. See supra Section II.B. 
 399. See supra Section II.A. 
 400. See supra Section II.C. 
 401. See supra Section II.C. 
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Priority 
Enforcement 
Program (PEP)402 
2014–
Present 
Federal 
agency 
prerogative 
Co-opting 
Responding to state and 
local resistance to S-Comm 
and incorporating new 
enforcement priorities based 
on state action 
 
  
                                                                                                                     
 402. See supra notes 245–48 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 1: Parallel Tracks in Immigration Law Scholarship 
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Figure 2: An Integrated Framework of Immigration Federalism403 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 403. By “Federal Executive,” we mean the President and high-level agency and cabinet 
officials under his control. In this Article, dealing with immigration matters, we refer to the actions 
of a limited set of actors— the President, the Secretary of State and the State Department, the 
Attorney General and the Solicitor General within the Department of Justice, and the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement within the 
Department of Homeland Security. We recognize that executive agencies might be considered 
separately from the President and that this framework might also include administrative agencies 
as another institutional actor. 
Federal Executive Congress 
States 
Federal 
Courts 
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